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Abstract 
Elliptic curve cryptography is a public key cryptosystem based on the el-
liptic curve discrete logarithm problem. The reason for the attractiveness of 
ECC is that there is no sub-exponential algorithm known to solve the elliptic 
curve discrete logarithm problem. This leads to lower memory requirements, 
lower computational requirements and higher security than other public key 
cryptosy stems. 
This thesis describes an implementation of a microcoded elliptic curve pro-
cessor using FPGA technology. This processor implements optimal normal ba-
sis field operations in The design is generated by a parameterized module 
generator which can accommodate arbitrary n and also produce field multi-
pliers with different speed/area tradeoffs. The control part of the processor is 
microcoded, enabling curve operations to be incorporated into the processor 
hence reducing the chip's I/O requirements. The microcoded approach also 
facilitates rapid development and algorithmic optimization; for example, pro-
jective and affine coordinates were supported using different sets of microcodes. 
The design was successfully tested on a Xilinx Virtex XCVlOOO-6 device and 
could perform an elliptic curve multiplication over the field F^ n using affine 
and projective coordinates for n — 113，155, 173, 281, 371 and 473. 
Elliptic curve processor is particularly suitable for resource limited devices 
i 
because of its lower requirements of memory and computation. It is applicable 
to be implanted into smart cards, cellular phones and other hand-held devices 
so that secure communication can be provided. 
ii 
摘要 
橢圓曲線密碼學（elliptic curve cryptography)是一個公開金输 







elliptic curve cryptographic processor)�它使用了現場可編程門陣歹[ 
(FPGA)的技術，它能計算有限場（finite field)上最優解正規基 








成功利用了 Xilinx Virtex XCVlOOO-6 FPGA通過測試，它能利用仿射 
幾何及投影幾何，在有限場(n = 113,155,173,281,371和473)，上 
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The Internet is growing at an exponential rate and has currently over 400 
million users compared with 45 million in 1996 [nua]. This figure is predicted 
to reach one billion by 2005. In order to facilitate the secure transmission of 
funds over the Internet, cryptography must be used. Cryptography is therefore 
a key to enable technology for the Internet and E-commerce systems. RSA is 
the most widely used public key cryptosystem today and the RSA algorithm is 
licensed by over 700 companies and has an estimated installed base of around 
500 million users [rsaa]. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an alternative 
public key cryptosystem to RSA. It was proposed in the mid-1980s and has 
become attractive in recent years because of its lower memory requirements, 
lower computational requirements and higher security, making it suitable for 
smart cards, cellular phones or any other resource constrained applications. 
Hardware cryptographic implementations give more efficient performance 
than software implementations. It is due to software cryptographic programs 
are compiled to run a sequence of instructions dedicated to the specific micro-
processor. Hardware cryptographic implementations can utilize the resources 
Chapter 1 Introduction i. 
and customize the architecture to maximize the efficiency of the implementa-
tions. Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM) use Field-
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) which are featured with logic components 
and routing resources. FPGAs can be programmed as hardware designs with 
different purposes and erased under the field for re-programming. 
In the last decade, FPGA technology has considerably improved. A state-
of-the-art Xilinx Virtex FPGA XCV3200E contains 32,448 slices which is 
equivalent to 4M system gates, and it has become possible to fit high per-
formance cryptographic systems on a single device. Such a reconfigurable 
hardware is particularly suitable for cryptographic applications because of its 
high flexibility when compared with traditional ASIC and VLSI designs. There 
are several advantages in using a reconfigurable implementation: 
• it is possible to implement many different cryptosystems on the same 
hardware platform. Therefore it can reduce the cost of development, 
and support future algorithms 
• the turnaround time of developing a reconfigurable hardware is usually 
shorter. Productivity can be increased and more sophisticated algorithm 
can be used 
• the technology of FPGAs and deep sub-micron are continuous improv-
ing. Therefore faster and larger devices are guaranteed in the future. 
These can improve the performance of FPGA designs with nearly no 
re-engineering work 
• the parameters of the cryptographic algorithm can be changed at any 
time. For most cryptosystems, the level of security is defined by the 
length of the key. With reconfigurable hardware, the key size can be 
easily modified. For example, in an elliptic curve cryptosystem recon-
figurable hardware provides the capability to use parameter dependent 
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designs specilized for different key sizes, curve parameters and underlying 
arithmetic functions. 
1.2 Aims 
The main aim of this work was to develop an FPGA based elliptic curve 
cryptographic processor using an optimal normal basis. In particular, a design 
with the following features was desired: 
• use advantages associated with reconfigurable hardware to develop spe-
cialized processors with arbitrary key size which are fast and flexible 
• use modular design to allow tradeoffs between space and speed 
• provide high performance by minimizing the 1/0 overhead and maximiz-
ing the clock rate. 
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis presents an elliptic curve cryptographic processor using an optimal 
normal basis. The work described in this thesis has the following features 
which distinguishes it from all previous designs: 
• the higher level curve operations as well as the field operations were 
implemented on the chip. This makes the I/O bandwidth requirements 
several orders of magnitude lower than for chips which only implement 
the field operations 
• the curve operations are implemented as sequences of field operations 
which are programmed in microcode. This allows algorithmic optimiza-
tions to the design to be made without changing the hardware 
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• a study of the performance of using projective verses affine coordinates 
for implementing curve operations was made 
• the entire design is generated by a module generator which can generate 
arbitrary key size ECC systems. Thus ECC systems of arbitrary size 
over an optimal normal basis can be generated (provided they fit on the 
FPGA device) 
• a detailed 'profile of instruction usage during execution was made 
• the parallelism of the field multiplier can also be controlled by the module 
generator, greatly improving performance 
• the initialization of the inputs of the curve multiplication to be computed 
was performed using bitstream reconfiguration which results in a savings 
in hardware and could lead to an improvement in speed. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
An introduction to cryptography is presented in Chapter 2. This is followed 
with an overview of the background mathematical theory for elliptic curve 
cryptosystems in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 contains a description of previous work related to this research. 
Previous hardware and software implementations of elliptic curve cryptosys-
tems will be discussed. 
Chapter 5 provides some history and background of elliptic curve opera-
tions. The algorithms applied to the elliptic curve processor is also introduced. 
Moreover, security that can be realized by using elliptic curve cryptosystems 
is detailed. 
Chapter 6 describes the tools and reconfigurable hardware that was used, 
including the tools that developed to facilitate the design. In addition, the 
Chapter 1 Introduction i. 
implementation of elliptic curve processor is introduced and the architecture 
of the design is discussed. 
In Chapter 7, results are presented and conclusion and some recommenda-





In this chapter, a brief introduction to cryptography is given. It will cover the 
important concepts of secret key and public key cryptosystems which are the 
two main classes of cryptosystems. 
This chapter begins with an introduction to cryptography. It is followed 
by discussing two kinds of cryptosystems, secret key and public key cryp-
tosystems. The details about public key cryptosystems are given next. The 
major components, one-way hashing functions, certification authorities, the 
discrete logarithm problem, key exchange protocols and digital signatures are 
discussed. Finally, a brief comparison of RSA and ECC is given. 
2.2 Foundations 
Cryptography is a technique used for keeping a message secret during trans-
mission through an untrusted and insecure channel. During encryption, the 
original message (called the plaintext) is encoded into an encrypted message 
(called the ciphertext). Similarly, the process that retrieves the plaintext from 
the ciphertext is called decryption. Encryption and decryption are usually 
associated with a key. In a properly designed cryptosystem, the decryption 
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Alice Bob 
Plaintext Adversary Original Plaintext � Plaintext 
M M 
Encryption Decryption 
E — “ 1 D 
Insecure channel 
Ke Ciphertext C ^d 
Key Source Key Source 
Figure 2.1: Overview of cryptographic transmission process. 
process can be performed successfully only by knowing the right key. The level 
of the security of a cryptographic system depends on the algorithm as well as 
the key size. Longer keys are less likely to be guessed and for each additional 
bit in a key, the time for an exhaustive search is doubled. An overview of a 
cryptographic transmission process is shown in Figure 2.1 
The transmission process can be formulated as follow. 
EKSM) = C 
DkAC) = M ‘ 
DKAEK 人 M)) = M 
where M is the plaintext, C is the ciphertext, KE is the encryption key and KD 
is the decryption key. EK{Z) and DK{Z) are the encryption and decryption 
of Z with key K respectively. 
The aim of the encryption is to make it intractable for an adversary who 
is eavesdropping on the insecure channel to deduce the secret message, or in 
other words, make it impossible to derive the plaintext from ciphertext without 
the decryption key Kd. 
Cryptographic algorithms can be divided into two types, namely symmetric 
algorithms and asymmetric algorithms (also known as secret key algorithms 
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Alice Bob 
Plaintext Adversary Original Plaintext � Plaintext 
M M 
Encryption _ • Decryption 
F — D ^ Insecure channel ^ 
“ K Ciphertext C ^ 
Key Source 
Secure channel 
Figure 2.2: Secret key cryptosystem. 
and public key algorithms respectively). Symmetric algorithms make use of 
a single key for both encryption and decryption processes {Ke = Kd) while 
asymmetric algorithms have different keys for encryption and decryption (in 
general K^ • Kd). 
2.3 Secret Key Cryptosystems 
In a secret key cryptosystem, the encryption and decryption key are the same 
(K^ = Kd in Figure 2.1). The decryption process is just the reverse of en-
cryption process with the same key. An example of secret key cryptosystems 
is data encryption standard (DES) [MOV99] which has been widely used for 
over 20 years. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
Secret key cryptosystems can be summarized by the following formulae 
where Es and Ds are the encryption and decryption processes of the secret key 
cryptosystem respectively. 
ES,K{M) = C 
Ds,k{C) = M 
DS,K{ES,K{M)) = M 
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Figure 2.3: Public key cryptosystem. 
2.4 Public Key Cryptosystems 
By careful design of cryptographic algorithm, secret key cryptosystems can be 
very secure. However, when a secret key cryptosystem is used, the key distri-
bution problem must be addressed. The receiver's keys must be distributed 
in secret and anyone with the key will know the plaintext also. A key could 
be distributed through a trusted courier, a phone system or some other secure 
channel. 
The generation, transmission and storage of keys is called key management 
It is often difficult to provide secure key management, especially in open and 
diverse systems with a larger number of users, for instance, the Internet. In 
order to solve the key distribution problem, public key cryptosystems were in-
troduced by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [DH76] in 1976 with different 
keys for encryption and decryption. 
Figure 2.3 shows how a public key cryptosystem works. Since encryption 
keys and decryption keys are different, the keys are generated in pairs, one 
which is made public and the other kept private. Suppose Alice and Bob 
have their own key pairs. The public keys are denoted with subscript "pub" 
while subscript "pri" is used to represent the private keys of each party. Here 
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Ep and Dp are the encryption and decryption algorithms of the public key 
cryptosystem. If Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob, she will use the 
public key of Bob ( K b — � t o encrypt the message and then send the ciphertext 
to Bob. When Bob receives the ciphertext, he can decrypt the ciphertext by 
using his private key ) to get back the original plaintext. 
An adversary who only knows Kh^uh and C but not Kb—, cannot de-
crypt the ciphertext since the cryptosystem is designed to make that process 
intractable. 
2.4.1 One-way Function 
Public key cryptosystems are based on a problem that is difficult to solve. 
"Difficult" in this case refers to the computational requirements in finding 
a solution. These hard problems are known as a one-way function in the 
terminology of cryptography. 
A one-way function is a mathematical function that is significantly easier 
to compute in one direction than in the reverse direction. It might be possible, 
for example, to compute the function in the forward direction in a second but 
to compute its inverse could take several million years. A one-way function for 
a public key cryptosystems is computational infeasible in the inverse direction 
unless one has additional information (known as “trap door”), which makes 
the inverse computation easy. The trap door, in fact, is the private key of the 
cryptosystem. 
2.4.2 Certification Authority 
Although public key cryptography solves the key management problem, it 
does not address the problem of someone using fake key to pretend to be 
someone else. To solve this problem, certificates are used. Certificates are 
digital documents used to bind a public key to an individual. They allow 
Chapter 2 Cryptography ^ 
verification of the claim that a specific public key does, in fact, belong to a 
specific individual. 
Certificates are issued by a certification authority (CA), a trusted central 
administration. A company may issue certificates to its employees, or a uni-
versity to its students. If a person wants to get someone's public key in order 
to send message to them, they can check the certificate of the key. If he be-
lieves that the certificate was issued by the CA, they can trust the public key 
belongs to that person. 
The most widely accepted format for certificates is defined by the ITU-
T X.509 [CCI88]. A detailed discussion of certificate formats can be found 
in [Ken93 . 
2.4.3 Discrete Logarithm Problem 
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is a one-way function that based on 
the difficulty of finding a logarithm in a group (see Section 3.2 for a reviews of 
group theory). The DLP has been extensively studied and has been the basis 
of several public key cryptosy stems. It is defined as follows. 
Given elements g and y in a group G, (an introduction to group theory is 
given in Chapter 3), the discrete logarithm problem involves finding a non-
negative integer x such that 
f = y. 
Some efficient algorithms for the discrete logarithm problem have been 
reported. They include the Pollard's rho algorithm of logarithms [Pol74], 
the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [PH78] and the index-calculus methods [HR82 . 
The index-calculus algorithm is the most efficient method known for com-
puting discrete logarithms. It is a sub-exponential time algorithm for some 
groups [MOV99] but not elliptic curves. 
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2.4.4 RSA vs. ECC 
The most commonly used public key cryptosystem is RSA. It was developed 
by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman in 1977 [RSA78]. It is an 
algorithm that depends on a one-way function involving the factorization of 
a large integer n. Here n is a product of two large prime numbers, p and q. 
The one-way function of RSA is to calculate n relatively easily if p and q are 
known. However, it is intractable to compute p and q if only know n (this 
problem is the problem of factorization n). 
Elliptic curve cryptography is another public key cryptosystem. Both RSA 
and ECC can provide secure communications, however, ECC has advantages 
over RSA or even other commonly used public key cryptosystems. RSA is 
based on the integer factorization problem while ECC is based on the discrete 
logarithm problem [Odl84]. ECC has the following advantages over RSA: 
• ECC always has a shorter key length than any known public key cryp-
tosystems with similar strength of security. Strength of security is said 
to be in term of the time to break the cryptosystem 
• ECC is probably more secure than RSA, the largest RSA and ECC chal-
lenges solved being 512-bit and 108-bit respectively. The solution to 
108-bit ECC challenge is believed to be the largest effort ever expended 
in a public-key cryptography challenge. It took four months and involved 
approximately 9,500 machines. The amount of work required to solve the 
problem was about 50 times of the 512-bit RSA [cer . 
Figure 2.4 shows how long should it take to break the RSA and ECC 
cryptosystems of different key length [cer]. The hard problem of RSA is fac-
torization of a large integer while solving the discrete logarithm problem is 
needed to break ECC. For the same security level, the key size of ECC is much 
shorter than RSA's (Figure 2.4). In other words, ECC provides a more secure 
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Figure 2.4: Time to break the keys of ECC verses RSA. 
cryptosystem for the same key length as RSA. In practice, 160 to 192-bit ECC 
keys are used nowadays. However, the acceptably secure key size depends upon 
applications. Current commercial systems which use 1024-bit RSA for com-
mercial transactions and 2048-bit RSA for high security applications [rsab . 
Then roughly correspond to 134-bit and 173-bit ECC respectively [LVOO . 
2.4.5 Key Exchange Protocol 
Public key cryptosystems can be used to securely transmit a common key 
between 2 parties. The protocol is shown in Figure 2.5. First, Alice generates 
a random key K. After that she uses Bob's public key to encrypt K and then 
sends the ciphertext to Bob. Bob can retrieve the key K by decrypting the 
ciphertext with his own private key. By using this method, Alice and Bob can 
compromise on a common key K. Afterwards, they can communicate with one 
another by using a secret key cryptosystem with the key K. 
Diffie—Hellman Key Exchange 
The Diffie—Hellman key exchange protocol was developed in 1976 [DH76] and 
it allows two parties to exchange a secret key over an insecure channel. The 
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_ Key pair 
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Figure 2.5: Key exchange protocol. 
protocol is as follows. 
Suppose Alice and Bob want to agree on a shared secret key k. First of 
all, there are public parameters p and g < p where p is prime. In addition, 
there exists k such that g^ = n mod p for every n G {1 ’ . . .，p — 1} (modular 
arithmetic is discussed in Chapter 3): 
1. Alice generates a random private value « G { 1 , . . . - 2}, calculates g � 
mod p and sends it to Bob 
2. Bob generates a random private value b 6 {1, . . .，p — 1}, calculates g^ 
mod p and sends it to Alice 
3. Alice computes g""^ = (/丫 mod p while Bob computes 二 
mod p 
Since g^ b = gba = k, Alice and Bob now have a shared secret key k. 
An adversary who eavesdrops on the channel can capture p, g, g'^ and g^ but 
not k. To deduce k, they would have to solve the discrete logarithm problem. 
2.4.6 Digital Signature 
One important application of public key cryptography is digital signatures. A 
digital signature of a document is a piece of information based on both the 
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document and the signer's private key. The functions of digital signatures are 
similar to traditional hand-written signatures. They have followings similari-
ties: 
• Authentication: a digital signature guarantees that the signer is the orig-
inator of the item 
• Unforgeable: a signature is a proof that the signer deliberately signed 
the document 
• Not reusable: a digital signature cannot be moved to another item 
• Unalterable: after the item is signed, it cannot be altered 
• Cannot be repudiated: the signer cannot claim that he didn't sign it 
later 
For a person to sign a document, they can encrypt the document with their 
private key. The signed document (ciphertext produced by encrypting the 
document) is then sent together with the original document to the receiver. If 
others want to verify the signature of the signer, they can use the signer's public 
key to decrypt the signed document and compare the decrypted document with 
the original document. If they are the same, the document must have been 
signed by the particular signer. On the other hand, the signer cannot deny 
that they signed the document in case they are only person that can produce 
a digital signature for that document. 
In order to improve the efficiency of the authentication process for digital 
signature, signers usually do not sign the message directly. A hashing func-
tion is applied to the original message and produced a string, the message 
digest (MD). The message digest is usually considerably shorter than the orig-
inal message. The signers can sign the short message digest instead of the long 
message making the verification process faster. However, the hashing function 
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Figure 2.6: Digital signature with message digest. 
must be designed carefully so that it is hard to find two messages that are 
hashed to the same message digest. 
The digital signature scheme shown in Figure 2.6 has the problem that 
a plaintext message is sent through an insecure channel. Figure 2.7 shows 
the digital signature process with message digest and encryption. In this case, 
Alice encrypts the message before it is sent to Bob and only encrypted messages 
are sent. 
2.5 Secret Key vs. Public Key Cryptography 
Besides the key management problem, secret key and public key cryptosys-
tems have different computational requirements. Slow cryptosystems can be a 
bottleneck for a computer system. Therefore the speed and the efficiency of a 
cryptosystem are important considerations. 
A software RSA implementation, RSA Data Security's cryptographic toolkit 
BSAFE 3.0 [rsaa], has a throughput for public key operations of 21.6 Ambits 
per second with 512-bit key length and 7.4 kbits per second with a 1024-bit 
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Figure 2.7: Digital signature with message digest and encryption. 
key length on a 90 MHz Pentium machine. The fastest reported RSA hard-
ware [SV93] has a throughput greater than 600 A;bits per second with a 512-bit 
key length and 165 fcbits per second with key size of 1024 bits. 
DES is much faster than RSA. In software implementation, a DES crypto-
graphic engine had been reported in [Bih97]. Its speed is 137 Mbits per second 
on a 300 MHz Alpha 8400 processor. In hardware implementation, DES is also 
much faster than RSA. In [PatOO], an implementation of DES on an FPGA is 
reported with a throughput of over 10 G'bits per second with clock rate of 168 
MHz. Therefore, in order to transmit a large amount of information, secret 
key cryptosystems are preferable. 
Public key cryptosystems solve the key management problem while secret 
key cryptosystems have a higher throughput rate. In practice, a hybrid method 
is used. Figure 2.8 illustrates a practical system. Before the actual transmis-
sion of the data, Alice and Bob first agree on a common, session key /\� , using 
a public key cryptosystems. Since the key size is usually much shorter than 
the plaintext, the key exchange process will not take a long time. After that, 
the transmission of secret information is done using a secret key cryptosystem. 
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Figure 2.8: Practical cryptography. 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, an introduction to secret key and public key cryptosystems was 
presented. The algorithms and the applications of public key cryptosystems 
were detailed and a comparison between RSA and ECC was presented. 
Secret key cryptosystems are efficient but there is a problem of key distri-
bution. Since public key cryptosystems solve the problem of key distribution, 
a hybrid cryptosystems is preferred so that high speed and secure communi-
cations can be provided. 
The key exchange protocol and digital signatures are the two main ap-
plications of public key cryptosystems. Key exchange is used to negotiate a 
session key between the sender and receiver. Digital signatures can be imple-





Elliptic curve cryptosystems use underlying operations which are based on 
abstract algebra and in particular finite fields. In this chapter, an overview 
of the abstract algebra required to understand the elliptic curve processor is 
presented. Finite fields have applications in coding, error correction and an 
cryptography [Kob87a, LN94 . 
This chapter begins with introduction to groups, rings and fields. The two 
representations of elements (polynomial and normal basis) are then presented. 
Finally, operations in an optimal normal basis are discussed in detail. 
3.2 Groups and Fields 
A binary operation + on set 5 is a mapping from S x S to S. That is, + is a 
rule which assigns to each ordered pair of elements from S. 
A group (G',+) consists of a set of numbers G together with a binary 
operation + on G which satisfies the following three axioms: 
• Closure: for all a, 6 6 a + 6 G G 
參 Associativity: the group operation is associative. That is, (a + 6) + c = 
a + (6 + c) for all a, 6, c G G 
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• Identity: there is an identity element 0 e G such that a + 0 = 0 + a for 
all a G G' 
• Inverse: for each a e G there exists an element -a G G, called the 
inverse of a, such that —a + a 二 a + (—a) = 0. 
The group G is said to be abelian (or commutative) if 
• a + 6 = 6 + a for all a, 6 G G 
Note that addition group notation has been used for the group operation. If the 
group operation is multiplication, then the group is said to be a multiplicative 
group with identity element is denoted by 1 and inverse of a is 
The notation will be used to denote the number of elements in a group 
G. A group is said to be finite if is finite. The number of elements in a 
finite group is called its order. 
A ring (i^, + , x ) consists of a set R with two binary operations arbitrarily 
denoted + (addition) and x (multiplication) on R, satisfying the following 
axioms: 
• {R, + ) is an abelian group with identity element 0 
• The operation x is associative. That {a x h) x c = a x (h x c) for all 
a，6, c G R 
• There exists an identity 1 e R with 1 ^ 0 such that I x a 二 a x l 二 a 
fox a ^ R 
• The operation x is distributive over + i.e. a x (6 + c) = (a x 6) + (a x c) 
and (6 + c) X a 二（6 X a) + (c X a) for all a，6, c G R 
The ring is a commutative ring if a X 6 = 6 X a for all a, 6 G 
A field is a commutative ring in which all non-zero elements have multi-
plicative inverses, i.e. for every a ^ 0,a e F there exists an element a—i G F 
such that a一 1 x a = a x a ] = 1. 
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3.3 Finite Fields 
A finite field is a field F which contains a finite number of elements. The order 
of F is the number of elements in F 
Let Fp be the finite field with p elements. If p is a prime number, then it 
is called a prime field. Numbers in the field F2 can be represented by {0 ,1} . 
If p 二 2打(called binary finite field or Galois Fields), numbers in Fin can be 
represented as n-bit binary numbers. The field (or has particular 
importance in cryptography due to its binary nature. It leads to particularly 
efficient hardware implementations. Elements of the field are represented in 
terms of a basis. Most implementations either use a polynomial basis or a 
normal basis. Finite field Fp is of characteristic p while Fqu is of characteristic 
Q-
3.4 Modular Arithmetic 
If a, b and n are elements in a field F, then a is said to be congruent to b 
modulo n if there exists k e F such that a = nkb. It is denoted by 
a 三 b mod n 
in which b is called the remainder of a divided by n. 
The multiplicative inverse of a modulo n is an a: G -F such that 三 1 
mod n. If X exists, then it is unique and inverse of a is denoted by a"^ 
3.5 Polynomial Basis 
A polynomial is a mathematical expression consisting of a sum of terms, each 
term including a variable or variable raised to a power and multiplied by a 
coefficient. The simplest polynomials have one variable, shown as follows 
anx'^ + Gn-ix'^''^ H h a2X^ + aix^ + aox^ 
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where a.'s represent the coefficients and x represents the variable which is a 
complex number. An example of a polynomial is 
+ + + + 2. 
Polynomial basis arithmetic operates the polynomials in a field of order p 
according to the same powers of the variable x with the coefficients are modulo 
p. Suppose another polynomial 
in Fio is added to the above example. 
+ + + + 2) + {x^ + + 3a; + 9) 
For polynomial basis arithmetic, if the coefficients are modulo a prime 
number, it is said to be a polynomial basis over a finite field. However normal 
basis arithmetic (described in the next subsection) is used in the work because 
it leads to more efficient hardware implementations. 
3.6 Optimal Normal Basis 
A normal basis is more suitable for hardware implementation than polyno-
mial basis because operations are mainly comprised of rotation, shifting and 
exclusive-OR operations which are very efficient in hardware. Moreover, there 
is an optimal normal basis which is a special case of normal basis with mini-
mum complexity. Therefore for the implementation described in this thesis, a 
normal basis was chosen. It will be discussed in this section. 
Suppose (5 is an element in the field Fpm, the polynomial representation is 
p = anx"" H h aiX + ao 
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where n < m. 
A normal basis can be formed using the set 
A finite field of characteristic 2 (i.e. p = 2) is chosen because of its binary 
nature. Every element A in the field F��can be uniquely represented in the 
form 
A 二 § a f 
i=0 
where ai G F2 and j3 G 
There are several operations among the elements over � T h e y are ad-
dition, squaring (element multiplies itself), multiplication and inversion (se-
quences of addition and multiplication) which are discussed below. 
3.6.1 Addition 
Suppose A, B are elements in the field Fin 
A =雙 a , , 
i=0 
i=o 
Addition is defined by 
/n-l \ /n-l \ 
A-^B= + . (3.1) 
\i=o / \j=o / 
Since every power of [5 is linearly independent, Equation 3.1 can be written as 
n-l 
A + B = + 
i=0 
where a‘, 6,- are added modulo 2. Note that there is no carry in finite field arith-
metics. So the addition can be implemented as a bit-wise exclusive-OR (XOR) 
operation. 
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3.6.2 Squaring 
Since every power of P is linearly independent, then 
/n-l � 2 
二 
\ i=0 J 






= X / 以 . 
i=0 
Moreover, 
Therefore squaring an element over Fan involves shifting each coefficient up to 
the next term and rotating the most significant coefficient down to the least 
significant position that is, rotate left operation. 
3.6.3 Multiplication 
Multiplication over field Fin is defined as follows. Let 
A = 
i=0 
B 二 它 b , 
i=o 
and 
C = A X B = £ £ = £ c f 
i=0 j=0 
therefore 
雙 X啡, (3.2) 
k=0 
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where \ijk G {0 ,1} . Then multiplication can be written to be 
n—1 n—1 
i=0 j=o 
where 0 < A; < n - 1. By raising both sides of Equation 3.2 to the power of 
then 
广 = 广 f P ” i = g = E 〜 k 广 ( 3 . 4 ) 
k=0 k=0 
Equating the coefficients of f P � i n the above equation, yields 
Xiji = Xi-i,j—i,o for all 0 < <n-l. (3.5) 
Therefore Equation 3.3 can be written as 
n-l n-1 n-1 n-1 
ca； = y ^ y ^ Xi-k,j-k,o(j'ibj ^ y ^ y ^ Xijoai^k^j^k- (3.6) 
i=0 j=0 i=0 i=0 
An optimal normal basis (ONB) [MOVW89] is one with the minimum num-
ber of nonzero terms in Equation 3.3，or equivalently, the minimum possible 
number of nonzero terms in \ij for a specific k. This value was proved to be 
2n - I [ABV89] and since it allows multiplication with minimum complexity, 
such a basis normally leads to a more efficient hardware implementation. 
Derivation of the Xijk values in Equation 3.3 is dependent on n. There 
are two types of optimal normal bases [MOVW89], Type I and Type 11. For a 
Type I ONB, there exists an optimal normal basis in Fin if 
1. n + 1 is a prime; 
2. 2 is a primitive in F^+i. 
Rule 2 means 2 raised to any power in the range 0 to n modulo n + 1 must 
result in a unique integer in the range 1 to n. 
On the other hand, for a Type II ONB, an optimal normal basis exists in 
Fan if 
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2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 14 18 23 
26 28 29 30 33 35 36 39 41 50 51 52 
53 58 60 65 66 69 74 81 82 83 86 89 
90 95 98 99 100 105 106 113 119 130 131 134 
135 138 146 148 155 158 162 172 173 174 178 179 
180 183 186 189 191 194 196 209 210 221 226 230 
231 233 239 243 245 251 254 261 268 270 273 278 
281 292 293 299 303 306 309 316 323 326 329 330 
338 346 348 350 354 359 371 372 375 378 386 388 
393 398 410 411 413 414 418 419 420 426 429 431 
438 441 442 443 453 460 466 470 473 483 490 491 
495 508 509 515 519 522 530 531 540 543 545 546 
554 556 558 561 562 575 585 586 593 606 611 612 
614 615 618 629 638 639 641 645 650 651 652 653 
658 659 660 676 683 686 690 700 708 713 719 723 
725 726 741 743 746 749 755 756 761 765 771 772 
774 779 783 785 786 791 796 803 809 810 818 820 
826 828 831 833 834 846 852 858 866 870 873 876 
879 882 891 893 906 911 923 930 933 935 938 939 
940 946 950 953 965 974 975 986 989 993 998 
Table 3.1: Values of n < 1000 with an optimal normal basis. 
1. 2n + 1 is prime, and either 
2a. 2 is a primitive in i^ 2n+i, or 
2b. 2n + 1 三 3( mod 4) and 2 generates the quadratic residues in F2n+i' 
Similarly, rule 2a means that every 2知 modulo 2n +1, in the range 1 to 2n (0 < 
k < 2n-l). Therefore 2 is called the generator for all the possible locations in 
the 2n + 1 field. Rule 2b means that even if mod 2n + 1 does not generate 
every element in the range 1 to 2n, however, half of points in the field of form 
by rule 2a can be hit. It is because mod 2n + l can be taken. The points 
generated by rule 2b are in the form of perfect squares. [Rie87, Ros98a 
An ONB exists in F ]� f o r 23% of all possible values of n < 1000 [MOVW89；. 
Table 3.1 lists these values. 
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k — 
」 _ 7 0 1 2； 3 
0 0 -0-. 1 Oj 0 
0 1 0 0 o j 1 
0 2 1 1 “••!•••• 
_ 0 _ 3 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 Lg— 1 0 
1 2 1 0 0 0 
_ 3 "1"; 1 1 _ 1 _ 
2 0 1 1 1 
2 1 1 0： 0 0 
2 2 0 O j U - . 1 
_ 3 0 1: 0 0 
3 0 0 Oj 1 0 
3 1 1 1 "^l"： 1 
3 2 0 1 Oj 0 
3 3 I 1 0 o j U " 
t 
Table 3.2: Multiplication table, Xijk, of Type I ONB in GF{2^). 
The multiplication table Xijk can be constructed by a A:-fold cyclic shift to 
X-Q [MOVW89] using Equation 3.5. However, Xijo is derived differently for the 
two different types of ONB described above. For the Type I ONB, A.^ o == 1 iff 
i and j satisfy one of the two congruences [Ros98a], 
� 
+ 三 1 m o d n + 1， 
^ (丄 7) 
2' + = 0 m o d n + 1. 
/ 
The multiplication table of Type I ONB in is shown in Table 3.2. 
XijQ of the table are built according to the two congruences 3.7. For example, 
Ai2o = 1 since 2i + 三 1 mod 5. Due to the fact that the two congruences 
are symmetric in i and j, if Xijo equals to 1，then Xjio equals to 1. 
Table 3.2 shows how to construct Xijk for k in the range 1 to n — 1 from 
XijQ (Equation 3.5). For example, the solid line in Table 3.2 shows that 
Aooo = Am = A222 二 入333. 
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The subscripts of Xijk are modulo n therefore, for instance, 
Ai30 = A20I = A312 = AO23 
shown by the dotted line. 
For a Type II ONB, Xijk = 1 iff i and j satisfy one of the four congru-
ences [Ros98a], 
� 
2' + 三 2k mod 2n + 1, 
+ 三 — m o d 2n + 1, , � � � 
> (o.oj 
2' - 三 mod 2n + 1, 
2' - = mod 2n + 1. 
/ 
Therefore, A^ jo = 1 iff i and j satisfy one of the four congruences 2' ± 2•^ 三 ±1 
mod 2n + 1 [MOVW89:. 
Table 3.3 is the multiplication table of Type I ONB in GF{2^). It is con-
structed according to the Equations 3.8. 
The lines in Table 3.3 show the cyclic shift relations on the multiplication 
tables. The solid and dotted lines represent 
Aooo =入111 “ 2^22 =入333 = A444 
and 
A440 = Aooi 二 Aii2 = A223 — A334 
respectively. Note that and are ONB so that the number of 
T s in every column of the table is less than or equal to — 1 [MOVW89 . 
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k 
_ i _ 7 0 : 1 2 3 4 
0 0 -9n' T"： 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 j 0 1 0 
0 2 0 0 I 0 1 1 
0 3 0 1 j 1 0 0 
_ 0 _ 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 j 0 1 0 
1 1 0 l-9-|"T i 0 0 
1 2 0 1 O j 0 1 
1 3 1 0 o j 0 1 
_ J _ _ 0 1 j 1 0 
2 0 0 0 0： 1r~ 
2 1 0 1 o j 0 1 
2 2 0 0 0 
2 3 1 0 1 0： 0 
_ 2 _ 4 1 1 0 0 = 0 
3 0 0 1 1 o j 0 
3 1 1 0 0 0 j 1 
3 2 1 0 1 o j 0 
3 3 0 0 0 L o - i T " 
_ 4 0 1 0 1 0 
4 0 0 0 1 0 1 
4 1 0 0 1 1 0 
4 2 1 1 0 0 0 
4 3 0 1 0 1 0 
4 4- -t-i 0 0 0 Lo_ • 
t 
Table 3.3: Multiplication table, Xi作,of Type II ONB in GF{2^). 
Using Type II ONB as an example, Equation 3.6 can be expressed as, 
Aoio Aioo 入 130 A230 2^40 
Ck = CLkh^k + (h+kh + Cll+kb3+k + Cl2+k^3+k + a2-i-k^4+k 
+ as+A+fc + aa+A+fc + a4+kj>2+k + (3.9) 
A310 A320 A420 A440 
where 0 < A; < 4 and all subscripts are modulo 5. The corresponding A of each 
product term of a and b are highlighted. Therefore Ck can be calculated by the 
appropriate shifting of a and b and the multiplication can be computed in n 
cycles. 
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3.6.4 Inversion 
Inversion of a is denoted by and is defined as below 
aa—i 三 1 m o d n 
where a and n are elements in field F. The algorithm used for inversion is 
derived from Fermat's Theorem [Men93 
a - i = = ( 广 1-1)2 (3.10) 
for all a ^ 0 in Fin. The method used was proposed by Itoh and Tsujii [IT88], 
based on the following decomposition which minimizes the number of multi-
plications (squarings are much cheaper in a normal basis). If n is odd, then 
1 / n - l \ / n - l ^ \ 
2 “ - 1 二 (2 丁 — 1) (2 丁 + I j 
and 
n-l 
1 / V 丁+1 
广 - 1 二 ( 广 - 1 ) (3.11) 
n - l 
and can be computed using one field multiplication provided a ? 丁 — 丄 is given. 
The cost of squaring is ignored because it is insignificant compared with mul-
tiplication. On the other hand, if n is even, then 
1 - 1 = 2 ( 2 几 - 2 — 1 ) + 1 = 2 - 1 ) + 1 ) + 1 
therefore 
{ n - 2 \ ( n-2 \ 
“2-1—I = (3.12) 
n - 2 
which takes two field multiplications if a)丁-！ is given. By decomposing the 
power of a in Equation 3.11 and 3.12, an inversion can be expressed as a series 
of squarings and multiplications. 
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An example showing the recursive decomposition of an inversion to mul-
tiplications is now presented. Consider the field F2173 and element a G F2饥, 
a / 0. Recall Equation 3.10, 
一 1 2 " - 2 a — a . 
For clearer illustration, only the exponent part is shown. So 
(Iteration 6) 2i73 — 2 = 2 - 1) + 1) 
(Iteration 5) - 1 = - 1) + 1) 
(Iteration 4) 243 — 1 = 2 (2^ 1 - 1) (2^ 1 + 1) + 1 
(Iteration 3) 22^-1 = 2 (21�— 1) ( 2 1 � + 1) + 1 
(Iteration 2) 2 i � 一 1 - (2^ — 1) (2^ + 1) 
(Iteration 1) - I = 2 (2^ - 1) (2^ + 1) + 1 
(Iteration 0) 2 ^ - 1 = (2 — 1) (2 + 1) = (2 + 1). 
and so an inversion over F2173 takes 10 field multiplications. 
Iteration s r decimal of r Calculation 
0 [T1 10 2 I 2 ^ - 1 = ( 2 - 1 ) (2 + 1) 
1 5 101 5 25 —1 = 2 ( 2 2 - 1 ) (22 + 1) + 1 
2 4 1010 10 210 —1 = (25 —1) (25 + 1) 
3 3 10101 21 221 —1 = 2(210 —1) ( 2 1 � + 1) + 1 
4 2 101011 43 243 — 1 = 2 (2^1 — 1) (2^ 1 + 1) + 1 
5 1 1010110 86 286 — 1 二 (243 — 1) (243 + 1) 
6 I 0 I 10101100 172 2173 - 2 = 2 (286 — 1) (286 + 1) 
Table 3.4: Intermediate values of s and r during inversion [n 二 173 二 
101011012). 
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The field inversion can be expressed in pseudo-code as 
INPUT: k e F^n 
OUTPUT: / 二 A r V G 尸2” 
1. Set s 卜 [ log2 nj — 1 
2. Set p ^ k 
3. For i from s downto 0 
3.1 Set V ^  shift n to right by s bit(s) 
3.2 Set g ^ p 
3.3 Rotate q to left by [r/2j bit(s) 
3.4 Set t multiply phy q 
3.5 If last bit of r is set then 
3.5.1 Rotate t to left by 1-bit 
3.5.2 p f - multiply t hy k 
else 
3.5.3 p <- t 
3.6 5 5 - 1 
4. Rotate p to left by 1-bit 
5. Set I ^ p 
6. Return I 
= 办 ) 办 （3.13) 
3.5.1 p 3.3 3.4 3.5.2 
Table 3.4 helps to understand the algorithm where s represents which iter-
ation is being performed (in reverse order), r is the shifted value of s in line 3.1 
of the algorithm. Equation 3.13 illustrates the intermediate calculations for 
iteration 1. The algorithm starts by initializing 5 which represents the total 
number of iterations and r in line 3.3 helps to calculate the squarings shown in 
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Equation 3.13. After that, in line 3.4, a multiplication is needed to calculate 
the “+1” of Equation 3.13. Then the value of r is checked, if r is odd, an extra 
squaring and multiplication is required (line 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). 
The total number of multiplies M required to perform an inversion in Fan 
using the above algorithm is 
M{n) 二 Llog2(n — 1)J 1) - 1 
where v{x) is the number of nonzero bits in the binary representation of x. 
3.7 Summary 
The operations of elliptic curve cryptography is based on calculations in a finite 
field where there are two representations of the elements. An optimal normal 
basis leads to a more efficient hardware implementation, and was chosen for 
the elliptic curve processor. Optimal normal basis is the special case of normal 
basis such that it gives minimum hardware complexity. The design presented 




This chapter begins with reviewing previous notable hardware elliptic curve 
implementations. They are divided into two categories, field processors and 
curve processors. Field processors can operate field operations while curve 
processors can operate curve operations as well. Afterwards, previous software 
elliptic curve implementations are described. 
4.2 Hardware Elliptic Curve Implementation 
4.2.1 Field Processors 
Previous implementations of ECC processors have mostly implemented copro-
cessors for performing the underlying field operations. An optimal normal 
basis multiplier over F2593 was reported in 1988. It used 90,000 transistors and 
occupied 0.3 inches on a side. This chip together with a Motorola DSP 56000 
was used to implement a complete ECC system which could calculate 5 points 
a second on a supersingular curve [AMV93]. In 1993, the same team developed 
a processor for operating over the Galois field F2155 [AMV93]. Their multipli-
ers of the processor was operated on normal basis. A coprocessor was built by 
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restricting the functionality of the device to the bare minimum necessary to 
implement the elliptic curve system. The coprocessor used 11,000 transistors 
and could operate at 40 MHz [AMV93]. The size of the coprocessor is less 
than 15 percent of the area of the smart cards available at that time. This 
implementation was intended to be compact yet secure. 
A compact super-serial multiplier for FPGAs is reported in 1999 [OP99 . 
Their design offers fine-grained scalability and is a sliced design which can 
trade off performance and area. In a polynomial basis over F>2i们.They first 
implemented a serial multiplier (SM) which contains k slices and computes 
GF{2^) multiplication in k cycles. The super-serial multiplier (SSM) emulates 
the operation of the serial multiplier using a smaller number of slices but 
requires more clock cycles. It uses m {m < k) slices and computes GF{2^) 
multiplication in A; x \k/m'\ cycles. The SSM was reported to use 2.76 times 
less function generators, 6.84 times less flip-flops and 5.78 times less CLBs 
than the SM. 
A multiplier for dual-field arithmetic was introduced by GroBschMl [GroOl . 
They used a redundant representation (two n-hit binary numbers to represent 
a n-bit binary number) to address the carry propagation problem. The esti-
mated number of clock cycles for a multiplication in GF{p) is l.bn (where n 
is the number of bits), while m clock cycles are required in GF{2'^). 
All the above implementations are Galois field processors which have the 
disadvantage that a high bandwidth interface is required to supply the copro-
cessor with its data. As an example, a curve multiplication may require several 
thousand field operations which must be sent to a field processor. For a curve 
processor, these overhead of the transfers is avoided. Another limitation of 
previous designs is that the field operations are restricted to certain groups 
(i.e. the subfield and extension fields of F2155) and these cannot be changed 
without fabricating a new chip. 
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4.2.2 Curve Processors 
A FPGA based processor for elliptic curve cryptography in a composite Ga-
lois field F(2n)m was developed by Rosner [Ros98b]. It could perform elliptic 
curve operations over a composite Galois fields Gi^((2”爪)in a polynomial 
basis representation. Moreover, it was developed on a reconfigurable FPGA 
platform, it is possible to easily change all algorithm parameters such as curve 
coefficients. 
A scalable, FPGA-based elliptic curve processor over GF{p) was reported 
by Orlando and Paar [OPOl]. Their processor uses a new type of high-radix 
Montgomery multiplier which allows precomputation of frequently used values 
so that the complexity of the multiplier is reduced. The frequency of operation 
of the processor is 40 MHz on Xilinx Virtex-E FPGA. 
4.3 Software Elliptic Curve Implementation 
A fast key exchange using an elliptic curve system was reported in 1995 [SOOS95 • 
It is a software implementation using the group of points on an elliptic curve 
o v e r 及 polynomial basis representation. This software implementa-
tion was optimized by a fast inversion algorithm, “Almost Inverse Algorithm". 
In fact, it is an optimized version of the Euclidean algorithm which only takes 
about three multiplication times for an field inversion. The implementation 
was tested on two platforms, on a SUN SPARC IPC (25 MHz, 32-bit archi-
tecture), it performed a elliptic curve multiplication in 124 ms and on a DEC 
Alpha 3000 (175 MHz, 64-bit architecture), it took 9.9 ms. 
In 1997, Guajardo and Paar reported three new efficient algorithms of 
the implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems [GP97]. They are one 
high-level algorithm for point multiplication on elliptic curve and two low-
level algorithms for finite field inversion and multiplication. For the point 
multiplication, they introduced a new approach that works in conjunction with 
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the k-ary and the sliding window methods. Their method can be applied to 
elliptic curve over any field, however they described their new approach with 
non-supersingular elliptic curves over GF(2^). It was based on the adapted 
version of left-to-right k-aiy exponentiation algorithm stated in [MOV99 . 
The algorithm was modified so that it applied to EC. A new approach to 
point doubling operation was introduced. It allows computation of 二 
(xk^Vk) directly from P = (x ,y) without computing the intermediate points 
2P, . •，2左—1 尸.Such direct formulae can be obtained by substituting X3, 
2/3 in Equation 5.6 into one another. By doing that, the point doubling, so 
as the multiplication, can be accelerated. For the two new purposed finite 
field operations, they work on ECs over a composite Galois field GF((2”"") . 
The new inversion algorithm is based on the idea in pT88] but is optimized 
for a polynomial basis representation and for field of characteristic two. The 
algorithm reduces inversion in the composite field to inversion in the field 
G^F(2”. On the other side, the new multiplication algorithm is based on the 
Karatsuba-Ofman Algorithm (KOA) to polynomials over 
There is a full ECC package in [Ros98a] that was used to evaluate the per-
formance of the design in this thesis. This package implemented main protocols 
in cryptography, for example, ElGamal key sharing [MOV99], IEEE P1363 
MQV key sharing [ieee], digital signature algorithm (DSA) [ieee], Nyberg-
Rueppel signature algorithm [ieee], etc. The package is an optimized software 
implementation for both polynomial and optimal normal basis representations. 
Optimizations include efficient scalar multiplication using a balanced binary 
expansion [Kob91] and the "Almost Inverse Algorithm" [SOOS95] described 
above. 
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4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, previous hardware and software implementations of elliptic 
curve cryptosystems were presented. There are two kinds of hardware imple-
mentation namely field processors and curve processors. 
Field processors have the disadvantage that a high bandwidth interface 
is required to supply the coprocessor with its data. Previous curve proces-
sors have concentrated on GF{p) and the author is not aware of any curve 
processors which operate over GF(2^), 
Chapter 5 
Introduction to Elliptic Curves 
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter begins with a background to elliptic curves. It is followed by 
a discussion of the curve addition and curve doubling operations on elliptic 
curve over real numbers. Afterwards, elliptic curve over finite fields as well as 
their operations are detailed. Finally, elliptic curve operations applied to the 
discrete logarithm problem and key exchange protocol are shown. 
5.2 Historical Background 
Elliptic curves were first discovered after the 17th century in the form of Dio-
phantine equation [ST92 
2 3 
y — X — c 
for c G Z. In 1955，Yutaka Taniyama asked some questions about elliptic 
curves, i.e. curves of the form y'^ = x^ ax b for constants a and b [RS97 
and Hellegouarch studies the application of elliptic curves for solving Fermat's 
Last Theorem in 1971 [Hel71]. Elliptic curves were proposed for cryptographic 
purposes by Koblitz [Kob87b] and Miller [Mil86] in 1985. The discrete log-
arithm problem over the group of points on an elliptic curve over finite field 
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is an attractive one way function because there is no sub-exponential attack 
known for solving this problem. The advantages of EC over other public key 
cryptosystems had been discussed in Section 2.4. 
5.3 Elliptic Curves over R^  
Elliptic curves E over the real numbers (R) are sets of points in the form of 
[x, y), X, y, GU, ae eR that satisfy the equation 
y"^  = x^ a^x + ae (5.1) 
together with a special point O, called the point at infinity which is an identity 
element. The variables x and y represent a point on elliptic curve and cover a 
two dimensional (affine) coordinate plane, RxR. Elliptic curve E over R^ is 
said to be defined over R, denoted by E{R). Elliptic curve over reals can be 
used to form a group consisting of the set of points G M x E 
together with an addition operation + on E{R). 
Figure 5.1 shows a plot of an elliptic curve over R. 
y2-x3+3 x-3 = 0 
1 -1 1 1 J—' r 
> 0 - _ 
, I I I ^ _ I L J 
- 6 - 4 - 2 0 2 4 6 
X 
Figure 5.1: Plot of elliptic curve y"^ = x^ - 3x + 3. 
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5.3.1 Curve Addition and Doubling 
The point addition (ESUM, also known as curve addition) operation + is 
defined on the set E{R) of points {x,y). By the rule of identity, the point at 
infinity O is the point that added to any point on the elliptic curve, gives the 
same point. Therefore for all P 二 G E{R), 
P^O = O^P = P. 
For each point G E{R), the square root of Equation 5.1 gives 
士y 二 a^x + ae. 
Therefore two y-coordinate values are given by each unique value of x to Equa-
tion 5.1. The point (x, -y), denoted -F € is called the negative of point 
P and specified as 
P^{-P) = {x,y)^{x,-y) = 0. (5.2) 
Addition on E{R) is defined geometrically. Suppose there are two distinct 
points P and Q, P,Q G E{R). The law of addition in the elliptic curve group 
is P-^Q = R, Re E{R). The geometric relationship is shown in Figure 5.2. 
In order to find the point R, first connect the points P and Q by a line 
L. By simultaneously solving equations L and E, an equation of degree three 
is derived with exactly three solutions. Therefore the line L is guaranteed to 
intersect the curve on a third point, say —R G E{R). The point R can be 
obtained by negating the y-coordinate of —R. 
In the case that the two points are P and -P (Figure 5.3), the line con-
necting P and —P intersects the elliptic curve at a third point which is the 
special point O lying on every vertical line in the coordinates plane. 
In an operation of point addition, if points P, Q G E{R) are added where 
P = Q, then the tangent line to the elliptic curve at point P is taken instead 
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x-3 = 0 
6| 1 1 1 7 7 
fy^ I • 
fii I i _ — I — I — \ ~ ~ I — 
" - 6 - 4 - 2 0 2 4 6 
X 
Figure 5.2: Addition of EC points. 
(shown in Figure 5.4). For this case, it is a point doubling (EDBL) operation 
where R = 2P. 
In order to express the definition of point addition and doubling mathe-
matically, 
P = ( � 
Q =(工2，"2), 
R 二 P + Q = {xs.ys) 
where P, Q,/Z G ^(R) , and 
Xs = — Xi — 
ys = 0{xi + Xs) - yi, 
e 二 ^ ^ if p^Q 
X2 — Xi 
or 
0 二 if P = Q. 2yi 
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y2-x3+3 X-3 = 0 
eP ‘ ‘ ^ ‘ T “ 
rkV _ 
>< 0 - 丨 -： T \ ： 
-^L I I I_I 1 L： -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 X 
Figure 5.3: Addition of points P and -P EC. 
The algorithm of curve addition on E{R) can be expressed as follows. 
INPUT: Elliptic curve E{R) with parameters 04, clq G R , 
Points P = G E{R) and Q = {x2,y2) G E{R) 
OUTPUT： R = P^Q,R= {xs, ys) e R 
1. If P 二 O, then set Ri-Q and return R 
2. If (5 = O, then set R ^ P and return R 
3. If Xi — X2 then 
3.1 If yi = y2 then 
3.2.1 Set 6 — ^ ^ 
else set R^ O and return R, •： yi = - y 2 
else set 0 f - “ 
4. Set x^ ^ - xi - X2 
5. Set ys 0{xi + X3) — yi 
6. Return {xs^ys) = R 
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y^ -x^ +3 x-3 = 0 
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X 
Figure 5.4: Doubling of EC point. 
5.4 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields 
Elliptic curve cryptography is based on the elliptic curve over finite fields. 
There are two finite fields which are particularly attractive, they are prime 
fields (Fp) and binary finite fields (Fan). The derivations of elliptic curve 
equations from the Weierstrass equation is given in Appendix A. 
5.4.1 Elliptic Curves over Fp with p > 3 
A prime field Fp is generated using a large prime p [LN94]. The operations 
of elliptic curve over Fp is similar to E{R). Instead of calculations on real 
numbers, the calculations modulo a large prime are taken. Therefore an elliptic 
curve E is defined over Fp, denoted by E{Fp), if x,y,a4,ae G Fp and 4a| + 
27a含 + 0 satisfying the equation 
Points on this curve form a group. Therefore the elliptic curve group 
is set of points (for x,y G Fp) and an operation + (addi-
tion) which satisfies the axioms in Section 3.2. 
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The order of a point A on E{Fp) is the smallest positive integer r such that 
+ A + ... + 4 = (9. 
r times 
The order of the curve is the number of points on E{Fp), denoted by 
By Basse's theorem [Kob87a, Men93], where \t\ < 2y/p. 
5.4.2 Elliptic Curves over F^ n 
A non-supersingular elliptic curves E defined over a finite field Fin (character-
istic =2)，denoted by E{F2n), is the set of solutions, {x,y) for x,y e F2-, to 
the simplified forms of the Weierstrass equation 
+ aixy + asy = x^ a2X^ + a^x + QQ (5.3) 
where ai, a2, as, a4, ae G namely 
+ = + a2X^ + a^ (5.4) 
where ae 0 and x.y.a^.ae G Fan. Again, an identity element (point of 
infinity) O, is included in both curve. Elliptic curve E over also forms a 
group that satisfies the axioms in Section 3.2. 
The curves of Equation 5.4 are called non-supersingular curves and are 
suitable for cryptographic applications [BSS99]. From a hardware implemen-
tation perspective, ECs over Fin are thought to be very practical. The benefits 
of using ECC are: 
• ECC offers the highest security per bit of any known public key cryp-
tosystem so a smaller memory can be used 
• ECC hardware implementations use less transistors, as an example, a 
VLSI implementation of a 155-bit ECC processor has been reported 
which uses only 11,000 transistors [AMV93], compared with an equiva-
lent strength 512-bit RSA processor which used 50,000 transistors [PID92:. 
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5.4.3 Operations of Elliptic Curves over 
A non-supersingular elliptic curve E over E{F2n) was selected for the 
implementation of elliptic curve processor. E{F2n) is the set of all solutions to 
the Equation 5.4 with coordinates in the algebraic closure of E{F2n) [Men93], 
where a2,aQ G 厂2" and ae ^ 0. Such an elliptic curve is a finite abelian 
group [Men93]. The number of points in this group is denoted by •E�F2n). 
The processor was implemented in two different coordinates systems, affine 
and projective coordinates. For different coordinates systems, the computation 
of the curve operations are also different. They are discussed in next section. 
Elliptic Curve Operations in Affine Coordinates 
The elliptic curve cryptosystems that will be used are based on the discrete 
logarithm problem over E{F2n) and the basic computation which must be 
made is curve multiplication. Curve multiplication is expressed as a sequence 
of point additions and point doublings. Similar to EC over real numbers, point 
addition and point doubling are defined geometrically. It is hard to represent 
an elliptic curve over a finite field graphically, however, the method of finding 
the point of addition and doubling are the same as shown at Section 5.3.1. 
Assume a non-supersingular elliptic curve E over Fin given in affine coordi-
nates and P, Q are two points on E{F2n). Let P = (xi^yi), Q =(工2,^2), then 
negative of P is —P 二（xi, + X,) G E(F2n). From [SOOS95], if Q ^ —P, 




xs = + <9 + + + a2, ^ 
(5.5) 
ys = {xi + 2:3)6' + + yi. ^ 
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Otherwise if P = Q 
� 
e = f + 
= 6>2 + (9 + a2， （5.6) 
ys =(工1 +冗3)没+冗3 + y i . � 
Therefore, in affine coordinates, both point addition (ESUM) and point 
doubling (EDBL) require two multiplications and one field inversion (note that 
field inversion is far more expensive than field multiplication). The following 
algorithm shows curve addition on E{F2n) in terms of affine coordinates. 
INPUT: A non-supersingular elliptic curve E{F2n) with parameters a飞,a^  G F2-, 
Points P 二 G E^F^n) and Q = (0^ 2, "2) € 
OUTPUT： R二 P + Q, R= {x3, ys) e F^n 
1. li P = then set ^ Q and return R 
2. If G 二 then set Ih P and return R 
3. If xi 二 X2 then 
3.1 If yi = y2 then 
3.2.1 Set 6> 卜，+ and xs ^ 0 + a2 
else set R ^ O and return R, ••• y2 = x i y i 
else set 0 and X3 ^  i-0 ^ Xi ^ X2 ^ a2 
4. Set ys — {xi + 3^)6^  + + 
5. Return (3^ 3, y3) 二 
Elliptic Curve Operations in Projective Coordinates 
A non-supersingular curve E{F2n) can be equivalently viewed as the set of all 
points E'{F2n) in the projective plane p2�F2n�which satisfy [Men93 
y'^z + xyz = x^ a^x^z^ + a^z^. (5.7) 
By using projective coordinates, the inversion operation which is needed in 
ESUM and EDBL operating in affine coordinates can be eliminated and it is 
covered in next section. 
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Conversion Between Affine and Projective Coordinates 
For any point (a, 6) G E{F2n) in affine coordinates can be viewed as a 3-tuple 
[x, 2/, z) e E\F2n) in projective coordinates with x = a^ y = b and z = I. 
Moreover, a point {tx,ty,tz) in projective coordinates with t ^ 0, is regarded 
as the same point as {x, y, z). Therefore the conversion methods between affine 
and projective coordinates are given as follows 
M(a,6) = M'(a，6,1) 
N'�M,r�= N ' � l , l , l � = N � l , l � f o r r ^ O 
where M, N are point in affine coordinates and M', N' are projective points. 
Curve Operations in Projective Coordinates 
The method of formulating the equations of addition and doubling in projective 
coordinates is the same as for affine. In fact, conversion is taken on each 
projective point and then applied to Equation 5.5 and Equation 5.6. 
Let P丨={x^ : yi : zi) G E'^F^n), Q' = {x2 : "2 : 1) G E^F^n) and P丨 + -Q' 
where P',Q' are in projective coordinates. Since P' = {xi/zi : yijzi : 1), one 
can apply Equation 5.5 to point P{xi /z i ,y i /z i ) and Q{x2,y2) for E{F2n) in 
affine coordinates to find + = : : 1). Then 
, B2 B A 
A Zi Zi 
where A = {x2Zi + Xi) and B = (y2么 1 + Vi) [Men93]. In order to eliminate the 
inversion operations, the denominators of the expressions for 0/3 and have 
to be eliminated. By setting 幻 二 A^zi and from the property of projective 
coordinates, = x^ z^s and ys = j/3^3, if 尸 '+ = {xs ： Vs : ^3), then 
= AD, 
ys = 
Z3 = A^zi 
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Affine Projective 
Operation ESUM EDBL ESUM EDBL 
Field Multiplication 2 — 2 13 7 
Field Inversion 1 1 0 0 
Table 5.1: Number of field multiplications and inversions for affine and pro-
jective point addition and doubling. 
where C = A + B and Z； = A\A + as^i) + ziBC. 
Similarly, the formulae for 2P = {xs : ys ：幻）are, 
= AB, 
ys = 
zs = A' 
where A 二 XiZi and B = aezf + xf. The resulting point can be converted back 
to affine coordinates by multiplying each coordinate by z^^. Note that there is 
no inversion operation when calculating in projective coordinates. Therefore 
inversion can be eliminated by performing curve multiplication in projective co-
ordinates and using only one inversion after a series of additions and doublings. 
The number of field multiplications and field inversions for curve addition and 
doubling are shown in Table 5.1. 
5.4.4 Curve Multiplication 
Multiplication (EMUL) is defined by repeated addition, i.e. 
Q = cP (5.8) 
= P + P + . . . + P (5.9) 
c times 
This can be computed using the following "double and add" algorithm. 
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For affine coordinates, 
INPUT: P e E{F2n) and c G Fsn 
OUTPUT: Q = cP 
1. C = E 二 € { 0 , 1 } , 6 爪 - l , m < n 
2. Set Q — P 
3. For i from m — 1 downto 0 
3.1 Set Q<-Q-\-Q (Affine EDBL) 
3.2 If hi 二 1 then 
3.2.1 Set Q ^ g + P (Affine ESUM) 
4. Return Q 
For projective coordinates, 
INPUT: P e E{F2n) and c G 卩2几 
OUTPUT: Q = cP 
1. c = e = l ,m < n 
2. Convert P to projective representation, P' 
3. Set Q' — P' 
4. For i from m — 1 downto 0 
4.1 Set Q' I Q' + Q' (Projective EDBL) 
4.2 If bi = 1 then 
4.2.1 Set 0 ' f - + P' (Projective ESUM) 
5. Convert Q' to affine representation Q 
6. Return Q 
which requires m + " ( c ) - 2 point additions where "(c) is the number of nonzero 
bits in the binary representation of c. 
The disadvantage using in projective coordinates is that extra registers are 
needed to store the intermediate results. However, it trades off an inversion 
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Figure 5.5: The hierarchy of elliptic curve operation. 
for more multiplications and other less expensive finite field operations such 
that the overall performance can be improved. 
The hierarchy of elliptic curve operation is shown in Figure 5.5. Curve 
multiplication is computed via curve additions and doubling which are in turn 
computed from field operations. 
5.5 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem 
ECC is based on the discrete logarithm problem applied to elliptic curves over 
a finite field (Section 2.4.3), known also as the elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem (ECDLP) which is defined as follows. 
Given Q and F, find x for which 
Q = xY 
where t G {1，... , — 1} and Q, Y are points on elliptic curve E{K), K is 
a finite field. 
There is currently no known sub-exponential time algorithms to compute 
X given Q and Y [BSS99]. Although the index-calculus method is a sub-
exponential time algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem, it is 
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not applicable to multiplicative groups in a finite field [BSS99] such as the 
elliptic curve group. The most efficient algorithm known is the Pollard-^ 
method [Pol75]. It is parallelized and the expected running is v ^ / ( 2 r ) with r 
processors [OW99]. However, the running time is still exponential in n. There-
fore the methods for computing ECDLP are much less efficient than those for 
factoring or DLP (Section 2.4). As a result, ECC provides shorter key sizes 
than others public key cryptosystems with the same security level. 
5.6 Public Key Cryptography 
The elliptic curve cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem. In order to 
communicate with others using ECC, parties must know the public key of one 
another. Before the communication, ECC key pairs are generated. The key 
generation process includes following steps. 
First define a set of elliptic curve domain parameters (丑(/<), Q, where 
E{K) is particular elliptic curve defined over finite field K, Q is a, base point 
on E{K) with its order 
1. Select a random number x where I < x < #Q — 1, 
2. Compute P = coQ, 
3. Then P is public key and x is private key. 
Suppose Alice wants to send a secret message M to Bob using ECC. Public 
parameters are the elliptic curve E over finite field K and Q is a point on E[K). 
Private key of Bob: a;, where — 1. 
Public key of Bob: (P, Q), where P = and G F(K) . 
Alice generates a random integer z 6 K and calculates the curve multipli-
cation 
A(Xa,Ua) = ZQ 
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and 
In addition, Alice has to embed the message, that she wants to send to 
Bob, onto the elliptic curve E{K). Suppose K = Fan and the message is 
expressed in a binary number. It can be obtained by changing the ASCII 
message to binary number directly. For the longest message that can 
be embedded in E{F2n) is of size n - 5 bits [Ros98a]. Then a n-bit binary 
number {xm) is formed by the message with length n — 5 bits and 5 "don't 
care" bits that can be changed freely. This n-bit binary number is substituted 
into Equation 5.4 to solve y (y爪)using arithmetic on F<2n. In the case there is 
no solution, the 5 "don't care” bits can be incremented and another attempt to 
solve the equation is made until y is found. Then the Xm and y肌 form a point 
{Xm.ym) on E{F2n) [Kob93]. In this case, Alice and Bob must compromise 
on the distributions of the "don't care” bits. It is safe to disclose these to 
the public and it does not affect the cryptographic strength. To embed the 
message to E{K), Alice gets a point 
M = (x^.ym) e E{K) 
and, calculates 
B{xb,yb) = {XtXm.ytym)' 
(A, B) is the ciphertext and is sent to Bob. 
Bob receives a ciphertext which is comprised of two parts {U^ V), where 
U = {xu, Vu) and V = {xy, y^). 
He can decrypt the ciphertext by 
xU = xzQ = zP = 
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Figure 5.6: Diffie—Hellman key exchange scheme. 
and ^m — ， 
Xt 
— ^ 
Vm — • 
yt 
Therefore Bob can get the point 爪).Since Bob also knows the loca-
tions of "don't care" bits, he can retrieve the message M by eliminating the 
bits. 
5.7 Elliptic Curve Diffie—Hellman Key Exchange 
The discrete logarithm problem can be used as the basis of various public key 
cryptographic protocols for key exchange, encryption and digital signatures. 
Elliptic curve 
Di伍e—Hellman key exchange scheme is the elliptic curve analogue 
of Diffie—Hellman key exchange (Section 2.4.5). An example is given below. 
Suppose that Alice and Bob wish to agree on a common key which is used 
for encryption using a traditional secret key algorithm such as data encryp-
tion standard (DES), but need to do so over an insecure channel such as the 
Internet. Then the following Diffie—Hellman (DH) procedure (illustrated in 
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Figure 5.6) can be used with a public elliptic curve over finite field K, E{K) 
and point P G E{K). 
1. Alice generates a secret random integer ca G 1 , . . . — 1 and sends the 
point Ca X P to Bob 
2. Bob generates a secret random integer cb G 1,... — 1 and sends the 
point cs X P to Alice 
3. Alice and Bob can both compute the key k = cax{cbxP) = cbX {ca X P) 
An adversary, Carol eavesdropping on the channel, can only gain the in-
formation E{K), P, CA X P and cb X P. For Carol to be able to compute 
k, she must solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and the best 
known algorithm takes fully exponential time. Alice and Bob, however, need 
only compute elliptic curve multiplications which are comparatively easy. 
5.8 Summary 
In this chapter, an introduction to elliptic curves over real numbers and finite 
fields were presented. The basic operations, curve addition and curve doubling 
of elliptic curve were also described. Afterwards, the elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm problem on which ECC is based as well as the elliptic curve Diffie-
Hellman key exchange were presented. There is no known sub-exponential 
time algorithm to solve this problem while there are efficient algorithms to 




In this chapter, the hardware platform and tools used to develop the elliptic 
curve processor is introduced. The implementation of elliptic curve proces-
sor (ECP) and its architecture of are also detailed. 
At the beginning of this chapter, the computer-aided design (CAD) tools 
that used are discussed. In next section, the hardware platform that was used 
to implement the processor is introduced. Finally, the implementations of 
each component of the processor is discussed. The features of the processor, 
for instance the parallel multiplier, microcode implementation and module 
generator, are demonstrated in this chapter. 
6.2 CAD Tools 
The ECP was developed using the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hard-
ware Description Language (VHDL) [Ska96]. It is a language that is used to 
describe hardware architectures. A considerable advantage of using VHDL is 
that simulation can be done before the real hardware is built. The chosen 
implementation platform was an Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). 
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FPGAs are re-programmable via a software downloadable bitstream and pro-
vide a short turn around time and low cost. The synthesis and implementation 
tools will generate a bitstream from the VHDL description that can be down-
loaded to the reconfigurable hardware. The synthesis and implementation 
tools used were Synopsys FPGA Express™ 3.4 and Xilinx Foundation™ 3.2i 
respectively. 
The development cycle is shown in Figure 6.1. FPGAs are suitable for 
hardware prototyping because they provide a short turnaround time. If the 
simulation of the VHDL description does not work properly, the code can 
be corrected and simulated again immediately until the simulation is correct. 
This can improve the efficiency of the design process. During the synthesis 
process, the synthesis tool takes the VHDL code as input and generates a 
netlist. Afterwards, implementation software reads the netlist and maps the 
logic to the components in the target FPGA. Then the "place and route" 
tools place the components in the FPGA and route the connections within the 
design. Finally, the implementation tool generates the bitstream file of the 
design for a specific FPGA. The bitstream can be downloaded to the FPGA 
to configure it, after which the FPGA will perform the function. 
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Figure 6.1: Development cycle. 
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6.3 Hardware Platform 
6.3.1 FPGA 
An FPGA is an integrated circuit (IC) that can be programmed after manu-
facture. Since it is re-programmable under field, it is a kind of reconfigurable 
hardware. Typical architecture of an FPGA comprises an regular array of 
configurable logic blocks (CLBs) with routing resources for interconnection and 
surrounded by programmable input/output blocks (lOBs). CLBs provide the 
functional elements for constructing logic while lOBs provide the interface 
between the pins of the package and the CLBs. FPGAs are widely used as 
a prototype before fabricating a VLSI design, or can be used directly in a 
product. 
The elliptic curve processor is built on the Xilinx Virtex™ FPGA. It is 
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Figure 6.3: Structure of Xilinx Virtex lOB. 
manufactured in a 5-layer-metal 0.22 jim CMOS process. Designs on Virtex 
can achieve synchronous system clock rates up to 200 MHz [XilOO]. Figure 6.2 
shows the basic structure of Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs. CLBs in the FPGA 
are arranged in rows and columns and between them are routing lines con-
nected with programmable switch matrix. By programming the switch matrix, 
the I/O of CLBs can be routed and connected together. 
The structure of Xilinx Virtex lOB is shown in Figure 6.3. The three D-type 
flip-flops are synchronized on the same clock while two are for input and output 
together with the other one is for the control to the output tri-state buffer. 
The input signal can be routed to internal logic either directly or through an 
input flip-flop. A programmable delay element at the D-input of the input 
flip-flop is to eliminate the pad-to-pad hold time. Moreover, by configuring 
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Figure 6.4: Simplified structure of Xilinx Virtex CLB. 
the threshold voltage Vref at the input buffer, the device can support designs 
with different voltage level. Similarly, the output from internal logic can be 
routed to the pad either directly or through the optional output flip-flop. All 
I /O pins not involved in configuration are set to high impedance state so that 
the internal logic is isolated. 
The basic building block of the Virtex FPGA is the the logic cell (LC). A 
LC includes a 4-input function generator, carry logic and a storage element. 
Each Virtex CLB contains four LCs, organized in two slices (Figure 6.4). The 
4-input function generator are implemented as 4-input look-up tables (LUTs). 
Each of them can provide the functions of one 4-input LUT or a 16 x 1-bit 
synchronous RAM (called "distributed RAM，，). Furthermore, two LUTs in a 
slice can be combined to create a 16 X2-bit or 32 X 1-bit synchronous RAM, or 
a 16 X 1-bit dual-port synchronous RAM [XilOO . 
Also within the Virtex chip are dedicated several large blocks of special 
memories, called Block SelectRAMs or BlockRAMs. They are configurable as 
single-ported or dual-ported in widths from 1 to 16-bits [XilOO]. These were 
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Figure 6.5: Wildstar block diagram. 
used in the ECP for the storage of microcode and for communications with 
the host (discussed in Section 6.4.3). 
6.3.2 Reconfigurable Hardware Computing 
The hardware platform that used to implement the elliptic curve processor 
is Annapolis Micro Systems Wildstar™ board [Ann99]. It is a PCI board 
consisting of 3 Processing Elements (Xilinx Virtex XCVlOOO-6 [XilOO]). The 
Virtex FPGA XCVlOOO-6 has 128 A;bits of BlockRAM (arranged as 16x8-A;bit 
blocks). In addition, there are 6144 configurable logic blocks (12288 slices). It 
is equivalent to more than one million system gates. 
Figure 6.5 shows the block diagram of the Wildstar board [Ann99]. The 
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three Processing Elements (PEs) are connected to a Local Address/Data bus (LAD 
bus) which is used for communicating with the host computer. PEl and PE2 
are connected to on-board memories. Mezzanine memory card can be installed 
on the Wildstar board to provide extra memory which is shared between three 
PEs. The elliptic curve processor described in this thesis used PEO only. 
6.4 Elliptic Curve Processor Architecture 
A block diagram of the elliptic curve processor is shown in Figure 6.6. The or-
ganization is similar to a traditional microcoded central processing unit (CPU) 
in that it consists of an arithmetic logic unit (ALU), a register file, a microcode 
sequencer and microcode storage. To compute a curve multiplication, the curve 
parameters are first initialized by bit stream modification (Section 6.7). The 
resulting bitstream is downloaded to the FPGA and the microcode is down-
loaded via the PCI interface (Figure 6.6). The ECP then computes a curve 
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multiplication, while the PC polls a status signal. When the multiplication has 
completed, the PC can download the result from the register file (Figure 6.6). 
Major differences between this architecture and a conventional CPU are that 
the datapath is n-bits wide and the ALU performs operations based on 
arithmetic instead of integer arithmetic (see Section 3.6). Three registers A, 
B and C are particularly for multiplication use and it will be discussed in next 
section. 
6.4.1 Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there is no carry propagation in the arithmetics 
based on Therefore the ALU of elliptic curve processor is simpler and 
faster than an integer ALU. The complexity is determined by the multiplier 
since multiplication is the only operation that involves registers. 
The multiplication is defined by Equation 3.6 and is given below 
n—l n—1 
cfc = y ^ y ^ Xijodi+kbj+k. (6.1) 
i=0 j=0 
It can be rewritten as 
n—l n—l 
Cfe = y^ bj+k ^ \ijoCii+k 
j=0 i=0 
with all subscripts are modulo n. 
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Define a function of the cyclic permutation 
n—1 
Fj{k) = bj+k ^ Xijocii+k 
i=o 
again with all subscripts are taken to be modulo n. For cyclic relationship, j 
is set to be equal to k, therefore 
n—1 
m 二 ‘ I Xikodi+k- (6.2) 
i=0 
The function F in Equation 6.2 defines the connection between registers A, B 
and C. 
Figure 6.7 shows the 1-bit register used for register B in the multiplier and 
a similar circuit is used for register A, It is just simply a D-type flop-flip in 
order to operate the cyclic shift on register A and B. Figure 6.8 shows the 
circuit used for calculating the Ck of Equation 6.2 [AMOVQl . 
In each cycle, the Ck th. cell computes sum of inputs from register A and 
then adds with the input from register B. The addition operation is imple-
mented simply as an XOR function (Section 3.6.1) and the squaring function is 
implemented as a rotate left operation (Section 3.6.2). Therefore Equation 6.2 
is calculated in the cell Ck every clock cycle. 
Chapter 6 Design Methodology ^ 
ao aj as • • • cLn-i 
y V y i • 
wiring 
” ” } r } r ) r ” ” ” ” ” 
Co Cj C2 Cj " 拳 c.i — 
？ ？ f •‘ ‘ • ‘ 
wiring 
？ ？ f 
bo hi b2 bs • • • K-i — 
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for the case n = 5. 
In each cycle, the A, B and C registers are rotated as shown in Figure 6.9. 
The result being that after n cycles, the contents of register C are the desired 
product of the A and B inputs [AM0V91]. It should be noted that an optimal 
normal basis reduces the number of interconnections and fanout of signals in 
the multiplier to the minimum possible, resulting in reduced area and increased 
speed over a non-optimal normal basis. In fact, the maximum fanout for ai in 
Figure 6.9 is 4 [AM0V91；. 
Figure 6.10 shows an example of multiplier when n = 5. By Table 3.3 and 
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Equation 6.2, the connections of cell Ck is defined by F{k) below 
F(0) = 6o(ai), 
F{1) = 62(ai + a4), 
F{2) = 64(ao + ai), 
F(3) = 6i(a4 + ao), 
F(4) = 63(ai + a3). 
Hence, 
Ck = bk{ak+i) + bk+i(ak + a/^ +s) + � + (^k+4) 
where 0 < A; < 4 and all subscripts are modulo 5. The result is the same as 
Equation 3.9. 
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The ALU can be easily parallelized. To increase the parallelism by a factor 
p, the multiplier logic can be duplicated p times. As an example, Figure 6.11 
shows the case for p 二 2. The multiplication requires�|1 cycles of parallel 
multiplication plus an extra cycle to form a final rotation. Therefore the total 
number of cycles required for a multiplication is [芸 + 1. 
6.4.2 Register File 
A 16 X n-bit dual-port synchronous register file is constructed from the 16 x 1-bit 
distributed RAM feature of the Xilinx Virtex series logic cell (see Section 6.3). 
This gives an eight-fold reduction in resources over RAMs based on latches. It 
is used for storing the parameters, for example, c, P in Equation 5.8 and a � , 
qq in Equation 5.4. These parameters can be downloaded to the register file 
by the bit stream reconfiguration discussed in Section 6.7. 
Figure 6.12 shows the structure of the register file. In order to give out two 
n-bit data at the same time, the register file contains two sets of 16 x n-bit 
distributed RAMs. For data consistency, both of them share the same input 
data bus and write address bus. However, read address buses are different so 
that contents of different registers can be accessed simultaneously. 
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6.4.3 Microcode 
The ALU plus register file form a Fin processor similar to previous designs 
AMV93]. However, for performing elliptic curve cryptography, higher level 
elliptic curve multiplications of Section 5.4.4 are required. This could be im-
plemented as a finite state machine [Ros98b] or in microcode. The implemen-
tation described in this thesis opted for a microcoded approach which has the 
following advantages in a FPGA implementation: 
1. the microcode is stored in Xilinx Virtex BlockRAMs and do not use logic 
resources of the FPGA (as explained in Section 6.3). The microcode se-
quencer in this design is very simple and has a small overhead. Since the 
critical path of the ECP is in the datapath, the microcode implementa-
tion of the control does not affect the overall performance 
2. the microcode can be changed without requiring re-compilation of the 
elliptic curve processor. The microcode can be altered directly by the 
host PC program 
3. algorithmic optimizations to the processor can be performed entirely in 
microcode 
4. a microcoded description is a higher level abstraction than a finite state 
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Operation Clock Cycles 
"NOT 1 
XOR 1 
Rotate left, ROTL 1 
Shift right, SHFR 1 
Field Multiplication, MUL [^1+1 
Transfer register value, TFR 1 
Jump Instructions 1 
JKZ, JCZ, JMP 
Table 6.1: Clock cycles required for each instruction using a p-way parallel 
ALU. 
machine and hence easier to develop and debug. 
The instruction set of the processor is shown in Table 6.1. Apart from 
instructions which directly control the ALU, there are three types of jump 
instructions: JMP — jump unconditionally, JKZ - jump if the least signifi-
cant bit of K register is zero and JCZ — jump if the COUNT register is zero. 
The K register stores the parameter c of Equation 5.8. If the least signifi-
cant bit of K is set, then an ESUM (Section 5.4.3) is performed. Otherwise, 
EDBL (Section 5.4.3) will be performed and K register will be rotated by 1 
bit. In addition, the COUNT register is initialized to all 'I's. It is used to keep 
track of the multiplication process. It is rotated along with K register and is 
used to indicate the end of a multiplication. Note that the K and COUNT 
registers are in the register file. 
Each instruction is 16 bits in width and the format of instructions is shown 
in Figure 6.13. The instruction width was dictated by the choice of a 12-bit 
address (the current implementation has < 512 lines of microcode and hence 
fits into 9 bits). Since there are 9 different operations which are encoded 
into 4 bits, 16 bits are required. Most instructions accept a source register 
and a destination register in operandi and operand2 respectively. The jump 
instructions have a 12-bit jump address. 
Chapter 6 Design Methodology ^ 
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(XOR,ROTL,SHFR,MUL,TFR) 
opcode operandi operand2 




15 11 0 
Figure 6.13: Instruction format. 
TFR operandi b a operand2 
15 11 5 4 3 0 
Figure 6.14: TFR instruction format. 
There are three special registers A, B and C which are involved in mul-
tiplication of a field element (as shown in Figure 6.9). Before multiplication, 
the operands are transferred from the register file into A and B using a TFR 
instruction (Figure 6.1). When bit 5 of a TFR instruction set, operandi will 
be transferred to register B. Similarly, if bit 4 set, the contents of register 
operandi will be transferred to register A. Note that bits 0-3 of the TFR in-
struction to the multiplier are unused. The NOP instruction was used in earlier 
versions of the processor to fill a branch delay slot caused by pipelining of the 
fetch and execute parts of the microcode sequencer. The final implementation 
does not have pipelining and these NOP instructions could be removed. As will 
be shown in Table 7.4, the result of leaving the unnecessary NOP instructions 
in the microcode does not lead to a significant performance degradation. 
The state transition diagram of the microcode sequencer is shown in Fig-
ure 6.15. It is implemented as a simple state machine. 
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6.5 Parameterized Module Generator 
The strength of a cryptosystems is determined by the size of the cryptographic 
key. In order to provide elliptic curve processors with different cryptographic 
strength to suit different requirements, a parameterized module generation pro-
gram was used. The parameterized module generator can generate the VHDL 
description of elliptic curve processors for any n with an optimal normal basis. 
Hence this scheme advantageously uses the reconfigurable nature of the FPGA 
to add the flexibility of being able to choose arbitrary n (compared with fixed 
n of previous designs [AMV93]). 
Besides generating the elliptic curve processors with different values of n, 
the module generator can produce processors with parallelized ALU as stated 
in Section 6.4.1. The module generator takes a parameter p which is the level 
of parallelism of the ALU. By varying p, different tradeoffs performance can 
be made. Therefore this can trade off between area and performance. The 
block diagram of parameterized module generator is shown in Figure 6.16. 
The module generator is a program written in the Perl programming lan-
guage [WCS96] which takes n and p as an input parameters and produces the 
VHDL code of the ECP as output. It first calculates the multiplication table A 
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Figure 6.16: Parameterized module generator block diagram. 
using the process described in Section 3.6.3. It then customises the VHDL code 
for the ALU based on the multiplication table and p, resulting in a complete 
VHDL description of the ECP. Perl is a language which supports long integer 
arithmetic which was helpful in performing the arithmetic required to generate 
the A matrix of the field multiplier. Since the ECP design is synthesized from 
a behavioral VHDL description, it would trivial to port the design to other 
FPGA families (e.g. Altera) or an ASIC. Input of the curve parameters can 
be done via the bus interface instead of bitstream reconfiguration for better 
portability. 
6.6 Microcode Toolkit 
For the curve operations such as point multiplication on an elliptic curve are 
implemented as sequences of field operations which can be implemented in 
microcode. A toolkit was developed to facilitate the microcode development. 
A microcode simulator and debugger was written to facilitate development 
of microcode programs. It supports all the instructions shown in Table 6.1. 
Moreover, breakpoints can be set so that the contents of the registers can be 
listed in the middle of the program for debugging. Single stepping is also 
supported. 
A two pass symbolic assembler was also developed which takes symbolic 
Chapter 6 Design Methodology ^ 
input and produces the binary microcode which can be downloaded to the 
processor's microcode store, BlockRAMs in Virtex. The assembler is written 
in the Perl programming language. Its strong string processing features helps 
in converting the symbolic assembly program into a binary form. 
6.7 Initialization by Bitstream Reconfiguration 
In order to perform an elliptic curve multiplication, the values of c and P in 
Equation 5.8 as well as the parameters of the curve must be downloaded to 
the processor. This is normally done by interfacing the register file to the host 
PC via a dual port memory. In this work, a bitstream modification technique 
was used to modify the contents of RAMs in which the parameters are stored. 
Since the register file consists of the distributed RAMs in Virtex (Section 6.3), 
they are placed in arbitrary locations. 
In order to modify the content of the registers, the locations of those CLBs 
which form the register file are determined from the circuit description file. 
The NCD file is an circuit description representing the design mapped to com-
ponents in the FPGA. This file is, originally, in binary format. However, it can 
be converted into a human readable format by the tools provided by Xilinx. 
Therefore the information about the locations of register file can be extracted. 
A software program was written which takes as inputs the human read-
able format of NCD file of the design, the register's initial content file and the 
bitstream of the design. It modifies the register contents in the bitstream ac-
cordingly and recomputes the cyclic redundancy code (CRC) of the bitstream. 
The resulting bitstream can be downloaded to a Virtex FPGA as usual. The 
advantage of this technique is that circuitry to download the parameters from 
the host PC to the FPGA is avoided, hence reducing the overall area and 
increasing the speed of the processor. 
Since only a small portion of the bitstream needs to be modified to change 
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the parameters, but the entire bitstream must be downloaded to affect the 
change, runtime reconfiguration techniques [BDH+97, XAOO] may be a more 
efficient approach. 
6.8 Summary 
In this chapter began with introducing the CAD tools and the design flow of 
developing the elliptic curve processor. It was followed by an overview of hard-
ware platform used in the work described in this thesis. The implementations 
of the components of the processor were also detailed. 
The ECP was developed on a reconfigurable hardware computing platform, 
Wildstar, which consists of Xilinx Virtex FPGAs. The device can communicate 
with the host system so that data can be transferred between them through 
the device interface. 
A parameterized module generator was developed which can generate el-
liptic curve processors with different values of n with different levels of paral-
lelism. The design of ALU was based on the cyclic relationship between the 
operands and the product (see Chapter 3). The register file of the processor 
was constructed by the distributed RAM feature of Virtex which can reduce 
the demanded resources. The ECP is programmed by microcode which can 
be downloaded from the host computer and are stored in the BlockRAM fea-
ture of Virtex. A microcode toolkit including simulator and debugger, was 
developed to facilitate the microcode development. A script was also written 
to modify the initial contents of the registers therefore no recompiling of the 




In this chapter, the performance of elliptic curve processor with serial multi-
plier is first presented. Then a comparison of the relative merits of affine and 
projective coordinates is made. Finally, the results using a parallel multiplier 
are given. 
7.2 Elliptic Curve Processor with Serial Mul-
tiplier {p 二 1) 
VHDL code for the elliptic curve processor was generated using the param-
eterized module generator (discussed in Section 6.5) for different values of n 
with an optimal normal basis (security considerations were discussed in Sec-
tion 2.4.4). Synthesis and implementation were performed using Synopsys 
FPGA Express 3.4 and Xilinx Foundation 3.2i respectively. Table 7.1 shows 
the resource utilization and maximum clock rate reported by the Xilinx tools 
for designs with different n. As can be seen in Figure 7.1, resource require-
ments are linear with n. Therefore by projecting the graph, the largest n that 
can be implemented on XCVlOOO-6 is 1100. The size of the microcode is less 
than 512 16-bit words and does not significantly change for different n. 
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~~n # of slices Reported freq (MHz) 
"TT^  l i T O ^ 
155 1868 30 
173 2148 28 
281 3315 26 
371 4247 22 
473 5264 18 
Table 7.1: Resource utilization and maximum clock rate for different n on a 








0 3^0 ？00 
n 
Figure 7.1: Number of slices used for different n. 
The ECP was successfully tested on a Wilds tar board (see Section 6.3), 
the microcode being downloaded to the BlockRAMs by the host PC and the 
parameters being downloaded to RAMs by bitstream reconfiguration. 
Examples of curve multiplication on the work are shown in Appendix B. 
Curve multiplications with n = 113, 155, 173, 281, 371 and 473 were performed 
and calculation results (public key Q in Equation 5.8) were compared with the 
ECC software package from [Ros98a]. The results were also verified by the 
cryptographic algorithm discussed in Section 5.6. Messages were generated 
randomly, encrypted using the public keys and then decrypted using the private 
key to verify the processor. 
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SW time {ms) Speed-up Throughput 
n E4500 PIII-866 HW time {ms) E45QQ P I I I - 8 ^ kbits/s 
113 27.6 l6 i y ^ 6 4 13 
155 63.2 40 8.3 8 5 9 
173 86.6 54 11.1 8 5 8 
281 281.8 196.2 29.9 9 7 5 
371 746.3 442.6 63.1 12 7 3 
473 1490.9 873.2 126.2 | 12 | 7 | 2 
Table 7.2: Execution time for elliptic curve multiplication (projective coordi-
nates) and comparison with a software implementation. 
The execution time of the processor was compared with that of an op-
timized software implementation of an optimal normal basis elliptic curve 
package [Ros98a] running on a SUN Enterprise E4500 with UltraSPARC-II 
400 MHz processors and a PC with Pentium-Ill 866 MHz processor. The re-
sults and the throughput are presented in Table 7.2. It can be seen that the 
elliptic processor is approximately 6 to 12 times faster than the software im-
plementation on E4500 and 4 to 7 times faster on Pentium-Ill. PC to FPGA 
communications overhead is negligable. 
7.3 Projective verses Affine Coordinates 
The projective and affine implementations share the same hardware design 
with different microcodes. The total number of cycles required for an elliptic 
curve multiplication for various n are given in Table 7.3, where assuming that 
the c of Equation 5.8 is a n-bit binary number with half the number of bits set. 
The execution time required for an elliptic curve multiplication at the maxi-
mum frequency is shown in Table 7.3. Note that these figures include the time 
for host processor interfacing. The implementations using projective coordi-
nates are always faster than using affine coordinates because field inversions 
are extremely expensive (Section 5.4.4). 
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^ HW time HW time 
n cycles (affine) cycles (proj.) affine {ms) _proj.(m^ \ P : A 
T U ] l i M i 134484 48 4^ 3 0.9 
155 324717 249879 10.8 8.3 0.77 
173 402926 310043 14.4 11.1 0.77 
281 1021814 784155 39.1 29.9 0.76 
371 2261605 1407005 101.4 63.1 0.62 
473 3657560 2267501 203.5 126.2 0.62 
Table 7.3: Execution time for projective and affine coordinate implementations 
of elliptic curve multiplication. 
7.4 Elliptic Curve Processor with Parallel Mul-
tiplier {p > 1) 
The dynamic instruction frequencies for a curve multiplication using different 
n are shown in Table 7.4. From the table, it can be clearly seen that the 
bottleneck is in field multiplication (MUL) which accounts for approximately 
90% of the execution time. 
The time taken for a curve multiplication using a parallel multiplier is given 
in Table 7.5 (n 二 113 and 473), showing that a parallel implementation has 
an 85% increase in area leading to 530% improvement in speed when n = 113 
while an 94% increase in area gives 994% improvement in speed when n = 473. 
Figure 7.2 is a plot of normalized performance verses the degree of parallelism 
p. As can be seen from the figure, the execution time improves as parallelism 
is increased and tradeoffs between area and performance can be easily made. 
Improvement is approximately linear for p < 6 when n = 113 and p < 10 when 
n = 473. 
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Figure 7.2: Normalized execution time for one curve multiplication using a 
p-way parallel ALU. 
7.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the performance of the elliptic curve processor in affine and 
projective coordinates and with serial and parallel multipliers were presented. 
The ECP had 4-12 times speed up over the software implementation. Projec-
tive coordinates was shown faster than affine coordinates. 
A dynamic instruction frequency analysis showed that multiplication ac-
counts for up to 97% of instructions in the ECP. A parallel multiplier improved 
the performance of the processor by reducing the number of cycles for mul-
tiplication. For n = 113 and 473, the parallel multiplier up to p 二 16 was 
tested, the speedup being linear up to p = 6 and 10 respectively. 
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Projective 一 Affine 
n I 113 I 155 I 173 113 | 155 173 
NOP M m 4 4 4 m m 444 
fo.22%) (0.16%) (0.14%) (0.2%) (0.12%) (0.11%) 
"KM. m m 9 4 6 m 酬 
(0.46%) (0.34%) (0.31%) (0.53%) (0.33%) (0.3%) 
~ M U L 1 2 ^ 2 4 ^ M m 1 2 7 6 8 0 288288 359136 
(95.79%) (96.89%) (97.2%) (85.93%) (88.78%) (89.13%) 
ROTL m m 24102 30015 
(0.5%) (0.37%) (0.33%) (8.63%) (7.42%) (7.45%) 
M b m 2 ^ ^ 7 9 3 1 8858 
(2.7%) (1.99%) (1.79%) (3.66%) (2.44%) (2.2%) 
~~mz m 173 m 1 5 5 173 
(0.08%) (0.06%) (0.06%) (0.08%) (0.05%) (0.04%) 
" I r a m m m i7i 
(0.08%) (0.06%) (0.06%) (0.07%) (0.05%) (0.04%) 
" j M P m m m i 5 3 i n 
fO.08%) (0.06%) (0.06%) (0.07%) (0.05%) (0.04%) 
SHFR m 170 ^ 2 7 5 3 
fO.09%) (0.07%) (0.06%) (0.83%) (0.76%) (0.68%) 
1344^ 2 4 ^ 3 l 0 0 4 3 1 4 8 5 8 1 324717 402926 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Table 7.4: Dynamic instruction counts (dynamic instruction frequencies in 
parentheses) for an elliptic curve multiplication using different n. 
72 = 113 n = 473 — 
p-way slices cycles Time {ms) slices cycles Time {ms)~ 
i 1 4 1 0 134484 4 3 5 2 6 4 2267501 l K 2 
2 1860 71204 2.6 6928 1150278 69.2 
4 1970 39564 1.7 7396 591666 35.7 
6 2076 28264 1.2 7872 402306 24.5 
8 2182 23744 1.06 8340 312360 19.1 
10 2300 20354 0.93 8799 253246 15.7 
12 2434 18094 0.89 9288 217680 13.8 
14 2515 16964 0.84 9752 192602 13.5 
16 2614 15833 0.81 | 10229 170340 12.7 
Table 7.5: p-way parallel ALU resource utilization and performance for pro-
jective coordinates (n = 113 and 473). 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
In this work, a novel architecture for an elliptic curve processor over using 
an optimal normal basis was developed. The processor can perform a scalar 
multiplication on elliptic curve, the central operation of elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy. The main results that were obtained are as follows: 
• the curve multiplication over Fin with n = 113, 155, 173 , 281, 371 and 
473 was successfully tested on the hardware with reported frequencies 
31, 30, 28, 26, 22 and 18 MHz respectively 
• curve multiplication in affine and projective coordinates were imple-
mented and tested. Experiments showed that projective implementation 
had 10% [n = 113)，23-24% {n = 155, 173, 281) and 38% {n = 473) 
improvement over affine. 
• projective implementation with serial multiplier gave an 4-12 times im-
provement over an optimized software implementation 
• the work with 16-way parallel multiplier (n = 113 and 473) gave 5 and 
10 times improvement over the serial multiplier and it gave linear im-
provement when degree of parallelism < 6 and 10 respectively. 
The processor used the reconfigurable nature of FPGA devices to achieve 
flexibility not attainable in a traditional ASIC. In particular, it was generated 
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by a parameterized module generator which can generate field processors us-
ing an optimal normal basis for arbitrary n using a multiplier with different 
speed/area tradeoffs. A microcoded approach was used to implement a curve 
processor on top of the field processor. Different algorithms can be imple-
mented by changing the microcode and the design has lower I /O requirements 
than the basic field processor. The microcoded processor has the advantage 
that a high bandwidth interface is not required compared with previous elliptic 
curve processors which only implemented field operations. 
With the advantages of smaller key sizes, lower memory and computational 
requirements than other public key cryptosystems, ECC lends to sending infor-
mation securely over the Internet where bandwidth and processing capabilities 
are limited. 
8.1 Recommendations for Future Research 
The thesis described an elliptic curve cryptographic processor performing el-
liptic curve scalar multiplication. This is an active area of this research and 
new algorithms have been developed with improved efficiency. 
An improved method for computing curve multiplication (cP) using a non-
adjacent form (NAF) [BSS99] has been reported. The expected length of the 
NAF is about one-third of the original binary form [BSS99], therefore the 
multiplication process can be made three times faster on average although 
conversion to NAF form is required. 
Another improved algorithm for computing repeated doubling (2'P) can 
further improve the performance [GP97]. It can compute 2'P for an elliptic 
curve defined over F^ n with only one inversion. It provides a faster computation 
for 2'卞 than consecutive doublings if the cost of inversion is 2.5 times or more 
than multiplication (which is the case for the ECP described in the work). 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
The elliptic curve processor described in this thesis requires the param-
eters to be loaded into the registers before the calculation started. More 
functions could be handled by the processor. For example, generating ran-
dom elliptic curves and elliptic curve point counting can be implemented on 
chip. This approach would improve the resistance of the processor to probing 
attacks [AndOl] and reduces the software support required by the processor. 
From the design point of view, FPGA devices are very suitable platforms 
for implementing cryptographic hardware. With low cost, high speed and 
feasibility of upgrading in the field, FPGAs will be used more and more for 
cryptographic systems on embedded devices. The work described in this thesis 
is just one example of such an application. 
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Appendix A 
Elliptic Curves in 
Characteristics 2 and 3 
A.l Introduction 
Elliptic curve cryptography is based on calculation of elliptic curves over finite 
fields. The equations of elliptic curves over different fields are different. In 
this chapter, it shows the derivations of the elliptic curves of finite fields with 
characteristic 2 and 3. 
A.2 Derivations 
Elliptic curve defined over finite field K, E{K), is given by Weierstrass equa-
tion^ 
+ aixy + asy = + a2x'^  + c^ rc + ae (A.l) 
where ai, a2, <23, 0,6 € 
Two elliptic curves Ei/K and E2/K 
El : + aixy + asy = x^ a2X^ + a4X + ae (A.2) 
E2 : y2 + a[xy + a'^ y = x^ + + a'Q (A.3) 
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are said to be isomorphic over K, denoted Ei/K = E2/K, if and only if 
there exists e K, u ^ 0, such that (x,y) on EijK is mapped to 
[v?x + r, u^y + u'^sx + t) on E2/K [Men93]. Therefore the change of variables 
{x, y) 一 (u^x + r, u^y + uhx + t) (A.4) 
transforms Equation A.2 to Equation A.3. The transformation A.4 is known 
as an admissible change of variables. 
Since Ei = E2 over K, then the admissible change of variables A.4 yields 
the set of equations [Men93]: 
� 
ua[ = ai + 25 
u^a2 = a2 — sai + 3r — 
u^a'^ - as + rai + 2t (A.5) 
u^a^ = a4- sa3 + 2ra2 - (t + r5)ai + 3— — 2st 
U^G'Q = ae + ra4 + r^as + r^ - ta^ - t^ - rtai., 
Therefore Ei/K and E2/K are isomorphic over K if and only if there exists 
u,r ,s ,t e K , u ^ 0, such that satisfy Equations A.5. 
A.3 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields of Char-
acteristic + 2,3 
For a field Fp, p (a prime) is the characteristic of the field. If the elliptic curve 
defined over field K of characteristic + 2, then Equation A.l can be simplified 
by completing the square and thus replace y by — aix - as) [Sil85]. That 
is applying the admissible change of variables 
/ 1 \ 
0, y) ^ ( a;, - { y - aix - as)^ 
transforming EjK to 
E'jK : y^ = Ax^ + h2X^ + 2h^x + be 
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where 
62 = cLi + 4a2 
64 = 2a4 + aitts 
= + 4a6. 
Moreover define 
bg = a^cLe + 4以2<26 — aia3a4 + a2a 赢—a\ 
C4 = 62 - 2464 
C6 = -bl + 366264 - 21666 
A = -bibs - Sbl - 27hl + 9626466 (A.6) 
J = i . (A.7) 
J A 
A of Equation A.6 and j of Equation A.7 are called the discriminant and 
j-invariant, j(E), of the elliptic curve. For elliptic curves in the same isomor-
phism class, their values of j-invariant would be the same. Since j-invariant is 
defined by inverse of A, it is real if A 0. Therefore, an elliptic curve is said 
to be non-singular (there exists isomorphic curve) if A 0. 
Further if elliptic curve over K of characteristic • 2,3, then the admissible 
change of variables [Men93 
( � ^ ^ , fx-3b2 y \ 
further transforms E' to 
E"丨K : = ? — 27C4X — 54C6. 
Therefore for field K of characteristic + 2,3, an elliptic curve over K is the set 
of points [x^y) satisfying the equation 
2/2 二 ？ + 秘 + 恥 (A.8) 
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together with O, where x,y e K [Sil85]. Moreover the associated quantities 
are 
A = - l 6 { A a U 2 7 a l ) (A.9) 
刺 二 - 1 7 2 ， ) 3 . (A.10) 
A.4 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields of Char-
acteristic = 2 
If K of characteristic 2, then j-invariant of E/K is [Men93: 
A ' 
If j[E) + 0, then the admissible change of variables [Men93 
/ 2 I 幻 3 丄 咖 + 以 遂 、 
V / 
transforms E to the curve 
Ei/K : = c^x" + as- (A. l l ) 
For Eu A = ae and j {E i )=念. 
If j(E) = 0, then the admissible change of variables 
transforms E to the curve 
E2/K : y2 + asy = x ^ a ^ x + ag. (A.12) 
For E2, A = 4 and j(丑2) 二 0. 
Appendix B 
Examples of Curve 
Multiplication 
B.l Introduction 
In this chapter, examples of curve multiplication performed on the work are 
shown. For each example, the parameters {a2,ae in Equation 5.4) and the 
private key (c in Equation 5.8) were randomly generated. The base point (P 
in Equation 5.8) was found according to the method described in Section 5.5. 
Numbers are presented in hexadecimal form with high order digits on the left 
hand side. 
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B.2 Numerical Results 
Example 1: n=113 bits 
a2 : Iffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 
a6 : Iffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 
Base point P : 
X : 16c80 3abcl07c 188dal58 67fa62d4 
y ： dele 607f7da5 8e4al858 a8ba7c60 
private key c : 
c ： 698a 82651d65 5d7a9d36 7d395bac 
public key Q : 
X ： 4f7b Ief82cb4 30f49db9 eaaaa5c9 
y ： 1070c 4970bfb7 d5249488 09e2de55 
Example 2: n二 113 bits 
a2 : ffff ffffffff fffdbf91 af6dea73 
a6 : 400e Ia3faf38 66484043 011647ac 
Base point P : 
X : cc73 99a652ba df30a35f 2adb772c 
y ： 9d08 3a0cf2d2 a3ell965 510c92f5 
private key c : 
c : 6fl8 9f251db9 04892ca7 18480fd5 
public key Q: 
X : 985 0e2ca6ce IfSOalab 49b8d839 
y ： bdfc ae9a446c 93a9c55a 4126f632 
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Example 3: n=113 bits 
a2 : Ie8b5 5472af02 c70d8ce0 fcc01e63 
a6 : 400e Ia3faf38 66484043 011647ac 
Base point P : 
X : lc817 0844ae3a fe571aa8 fed48497 
y ： lb87b fa893d86 c50395dl ffal5a9d 
private key c : 
c : 8ele 55dcdf6f 0e94e98b eca355e2 
public key Q : 
X ： 1847e b0a88f63 22a214f6 f3476329 
y ： IfeSa b79dd95e 658e0ca2 c00f2670 
Example 4: n=155 bits 
a2 : Tffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 
a6 : Tffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 
Base point P : 
X ： 4b2c670 a207432f 050cba69 ef6f260d 7403b9bd 
y ： Ic06f8e a6fb07fl 5d8ed4eb ab829d8a 230e5bb3 
private key c : 
c : 4b22557 e7a21ca7 c2569ce0 36c38148 6246725a 
public key Q : 
X ： 3f601e7 3f983025 7e6bbl29 98cb4606 7e2bd780 
Y ： 2CC9915 7a2c5f40 45ed81fl 67f2cbla 74d9e54c 
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Example 5: n=155 bits 
a2 : 1999999 9999998e dbbbc76b 2af2dfd7 cdl92el7 
a6 : fffe202 97eeade8 751a888b dbbldaec c4bfca37 
Base point P : 
X ： 4fceb80 c9954b5f cb803e0b 2c730d92 545af31c 
y ： Tfablal 536648al 1778553a bd504650 9a3e3017 
private key c : 
c : 7251db9 0486ec38 c7b5fa48 01509251 elclbaal 
public key Q : 
X ： 104931e 28440337 eld9596a baabOaSe 6edbd668 
y ： fed596 17875d96 f822efe3 15c3b793 eae8515d 
Example 6: n=155 bits 
a2 : 3ad89d a8278400 6a468427 6eb52e36 75192el7 
a6 : fffe202 97eeade8 7535b64e ef46fd00 771f8507 
Base point P : 
X ： 736b98f 0af0e23d 98645286 9ecl2595 3bb523ab 
y ： Il9bf37 e3棚733 75ala759 955d08d4 f2d44454 
private key c : 
c ： 74bd6c5 blleb9fb aa2008ab 1421858a 58c5b599 
public key Q : 
X ： 67c3b2d 76af4c68 45e8576b d4cee873 e644b23f 
y ： 2dlb76b 9ee7d52f 5a3154a7 49bf82c6 7fa69ec5 
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Example 7: n=173 bits 
a2 : Ifff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
a6 : Ifff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 
Base point P : 
X : 13c5 44136e20 dacbOeea 358dcdf6 46ba8547 OfdaOaaf 
y ： 69f 0419abb4 d4f94960 e4a5b01f 5feaefa8 7d40ae76 
private key c : 
c : lb elObecOd 953acd8c a37577a3 0flc73bc 2c8e8fd5 
public key Q : 
X : 39d 312e6fda 6c5507af b5e4b2c5 312a7930 9e6477a7 
y ： 192c 74cb81b5 a4c959f0 ddldf342 OceeaacS 898303c3 
Example 8: n=173 bits 
a2 : 1 5b3cb9al 8fe52a3d 4cc05920 caa4f2bl 7c682af2 
a6 : 15b04 Id8al21c 74c84653 97b6c30f 4fadff64 bce86df2 
Base point P : 
X : lf67 f43f7b75 fcel2bce 46fd7331 4c04248f 8671de5d 
y ： I7af d85d7132 673d3a91 bl4df784 74b80d84 e40d836c 
private key c : 
c ： ld3 d91376fc d7bblc59 c7057e80 24c96flc 0c550126 
public key Q : 
X : 1113 3d013f5e cbe4bcb5 644de4fe c7d949c5 19993f97 
y . 707 254df99f eel91c36 9c79e822 303f6d30 879aec8b 
Appendix B Examples of Curve Multiplication 卯 
Example 9: 71=173 bits 
a2 : 8 6ca9f209 17fl2a53 06dlc990 9b9e9102 7a5136f2 
a6 : 113f6 3af371d5 28cd33f7 a94d255c ecbaacaT 57186df2 
Base point P : 
X ： 47b 7f4c2633 3f84b65b 82bef409 c9dd884a 751b764f 
y ： cbO 70e53ae6 c6abda6d Ofa555c2 4cb9ed7a 60288e8d 
private key c : 
c: 54 dbaaacf9 a467e7cl f416e71a 8aff78e0 2e2346cl 
public key Q : 
X : 8f5 e0dd3934 03432022 9d7cb4dd 45b6eda7 9674c557 
y ： ce5 6faa7d70 46a67747 02190ecf celac463 e2f6bd01 
^ ^ 輕 。 . ： ： ？ 1 —
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